Crimes Against Humanity Against the Rohingya Committed by the United League of Arakan, Arakan Army (ULA/AA)

Arakan Army Committed Crimes Against Humanity Against the Rohingya.

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Executive Summary

For decades, the Rohingya have faced persecution, violence, and displacement in Myanmar. In 2017, the Myanmar military carried out mass killings, sexual violence, and the destruction of Rohingya villages. More than 700,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh. Today, many Rohingya who remain in Rakhine State face serious abuses under another armed authority: the United League of Arakan and its armed wing, the Arakan Army (ULA/AA).

This report examines the conduct of the ULA/AA toward Rohingya civilians from its establishment in 2009 to 25 October 2026. It focuses on the period since November 2023, when the AA expanded its military operations and gained control over large parts of Rakhine State. The report draws on United Nations investigations, human rights reports, survivor testimony, local reporting, visual evidence, and public statements by the AA. It examines not only what happened during the fighting, but also how Rohingya civilians have been treated under AA administration.

The report concludes that documented conduct attributable to AA personnel constitutes crimes against humanity under Article 7 of the Rome Statute. This conclusion is based on evidence of deliberate killings, forced displacement, severe deprivation of liberty, torture, persecution, and related abuses. It also rests on the wider pattern in which these acts occurred. The evidence indicates that the violations were not limited to isolated incidents during military operations. They extended across different locations and continued after the AA established control over civilian communities.

Principal Findings

The report identifies several patterns of serious violations against Rohingya civilians.

First, there is substantial evidence of deliberate killings of Rohingya civilians by AA personnel. One of the strongest documented cases is the massacre at Hoyyar Siri village in Buthidaung Township on 2 May 2024. In May 2026, Human Rights Watch published an investigation based on 41 witness interviews, satellite imagery, photographs, and verified videos. It documented more than 170 villagers reported killed or missing, including approximately 90 children. Witnesses described AA fighters shooting civilians who were trying to escape, including people carrying white flags. The AA denied responsibility. However, the investigation provides strong evidence of deliberate attacks against civilians.

Other accounts describe Rohingya men allegedly abducted by AA fighters and later found dead, sometimes with signs of severe violence. These cases indicate unlawful detention, torture, disappearance, and killing. The precise legal elements of each offense still require individual assessment.

The report also examines the August 2024 attacks near the Naf River, where Rohingya civilians attempting to flee to Bangladesh were reportedly killed by drone strikes. Rohingya eyewitnesses implicated the AA, while the organization denied responsibility. These accounts remain important evidence. However, the report does not treat disputed attribution as conclusively established.

Second, the evidence indicates that forced displacement has continued beyond the immediate fighting. Rohingya civilians have reportedly been forced from their villages, confined in displacement camps, and prevented from returning to their homes. Survivors of the Hoyyar Siri massacre faced restrictions on movement and inadequate access to basic services. Other families reported finding their homes destroyed or being prohibited from rebuilding.

The report also examines allegations that Rohingya returning from Bangladesh were detained, abused, and forcibly sent back across the border. Some of these accounts have not been independently verified. They nevertheless raise serious concerns about the treatment of returnees and the use of detention to discourage return.

Third, the evidence supports the conclusion that displacement is becoming a permanent feature of AA policy. The report documents land confiscation, the clearance of Rohingya settlements, restrictions on rebuilding, and the reported construction of new settlements on land previously occupied by Rohingya families. These practices have consequences beyond the immediate loss of property. They threaten the ability of displaced communities to return and rebuild their lives.

The central concern is not only that Rohingya families have been forced to leave. It is that their homes, land, and means of returning are being taken away. The combination of displacement, restrictions on return, and changes in land use supports the report's finding that the removal of Rohingya communities is becoming increasingly permanent.

Fourth, the report documents a wider system of discriminatory treatment under AA authority. Rohingya residents have reported restrictions on movement, farming, fishing, employment, and access to essential services. Some have been required to obtain travel permits or make payments to local authorities. Others have described arbitrary detention, forced labor, coercive recruitment, and punishment for refusing demands.

The report also examines allegations of sexual violence and the recruitment of children, women, and girls. The strength of the evidence differs between incidents. Some findings are supported by multiple sources, while others rely on testimony that requires further investigation.

These practices must be assessed within their wider context. A movement restriction, labor demand, or recruitment practice does not automatically constitute a crime against humanity. However, such acts may provide evidence of persecution, forcible transfer, imprisonment, enslavement, or other prohibited conduct when the relevant legal requirements are met. Some may also constitute separate war crimes.

Legal Assessment: Crimes Against Humanity

Article 7 of the Rome Statute establishes specific requirements for crimes against humanity. A prohibited act must form part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population. The attack must be carried out pursuant to or in furtherance of a state or organizational policy. The perpetrator must also know that the act forms part of the attack or intend it to be part of that attack.

The report finds that the documented conduct attributable to AA personnel satisfies these requirements.

The evidence shows a course of conduct directed against Rohingya civilians. It includes deliberate killings during military operations and continuing abuses under AA administration. The violations occurred across multiple communities and over an extended period. Their recurrence, geographic reach, and use of administrative structures support the finding that the attack was widespread or systematic.

The report also finds evidence supporting the organizational-policy requirement. The AA exercises military and administrative authority over large areas of Rakhine State. Reported abuses include recurring restrictions, detention practices, labor demands, and decisions affecting the return and property rights of Rohingya civilians. These practices provide grounds to infer organizational involvement beyond the actions of individual fighters.

The strongest evidence supports murder, particularly in relation to Hoyyar Siri. Other documented conduct supports findings concerning forcible transfer, severe deprivation of liberty, torture, and persecution. Allegations of sexual violence and enforced disappearance require careful assessment of the evidence and legal elements in each case.

The report distinguishes crimes against humanity from war crimes. Property destruction, forced recruitment, and forced labor are not automatically standalone offenses under Article 7. Their legal significance depends on the circumstances and their connection to specific prohibited acts.

The report's conclusion concerns the legal character of documented conduct. It does not establish the criminal guilt of every AA member or identify every person responsible. Individual criminal responsibility, including that of commanders and civilian superiors, must be determined through independent investigations and judicial proceedings.

Attribution and Evidentiary Limits

The conflict in Rakhine State involves several armed actors. The Myanmar military, the AA, and Rohingya armed groups have all operated in affected areas. Responsibility for their actions must be assessed separately.

The report does not attribute every civilian death, destroyed village, or displacement to the AA. It examines witness accounts, territorial control, visual evidence, reported orders, and competing explanations. It also considers AA denials and responses to allegations.

Some incidents are supported by extensive investigations. Others remain disputed or lack independent corroboration. Restricted access to Rakhine State, risks to witnesses, and the destruction of physical evidence make verification difficult.

These limitations do not erase the evidence that is available. Nor do they justify treating every allegation as established facts. The report reaches its legal conclusion on the documented conduct that can be supported, while identifying where further investigation is necessary.

Recommendations

1. To the United League of Arakan and Arakan Army (ULA/AA)

Immediately end attacks on Rohingya civilians, unlawful detention, torture, forced displacement, forced labor, and discriminatory restrictions. Prevent further confiscation or redistribution of Rohingya land. Restore housing and property rights, permit safe and voluntary return, disclose the whereabouts of detainees and missing persons, and cooperate with independent accountability mechanisms.

2. To the International Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor

Assess whether crimes attributable to AA personnel fall within the Court's jurisdiction, particularly where elements of alleged deportation or other crimes occurred in Bangladesh. Where jurisdiction and evidence permit, pursue individual criminal responsibility, including command and superior responsibility under Articles 25 and 28 of the Rome Statute.

3. To the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM)

Ensure that evidence concerning crimes attributable to AA personnel is analyzed and developed into case files suitable for use by competent courts. Prioritize evidence linking documented offenses to identifiable perpetrators, command structures, organizational policies, and decisions that enabled or sustained the abuses.

4. To the United Nations Security Council and UN Member States

Support accountability through available international and national legal mechanisms. Consider appropriate measures against individuals credibly implicated in serious violations, consistent with applicable legal standards. Support judicial cooperation, evidence preservation, and independent access to affected communities. Where legally and politically feasible, pursue measures that address accountability gaps arising from Myanmar's non-party status under the Rome Statute.

5. To Governments and International Organizations Engaging with the ULA/AA

Make the protection of Rohingya civilians a clear priority in political and humanitarian engagement. Seek measurable commitments to end discriminatory restrictions, restore confiscated land, prevent further displacement, and permit independent monitoring. Assess compliance through verified changes in practice rather than public assurances alone.

I. Introduction

For decades, the Rohingya have faced violence, discrimination, and exclusion in Myanmar. They have been denied citizenship, restricted in their movement, and deprived of basic rights. In 2017, the Myanmar military carried out a campaign of mass killings, sexual violence, and village destruction that forced more than 700,000 Rohingya to flee to Bangladesh. The United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission later found evidence that senior Myanmar military leaders should be investigated and prosecuted for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.^[1]

The violence of 2017 was not the beginning of Rohingya persecution. It was the result of decades of state policies that treated the Rohingya as outsiders in their own homeland. Myanmar's 1982 Citizenship Law and the restrictions that followed left generations of Rohingya without effective citizenship protection. Families faced limits on travel, education, healthcare, marriage, and employment. These policies made Rohingya communities vulnerable long before the military launched its 2017 operations.^[2]

The international response has largely focused on the Myanmar military. The case brought by The Gambia before the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court's investigation into the Bangladesh/Myanmar situation, and other accountability efforts have kept attention on the military's responsibility. Yet the situation inside Rakhine State has changed. The Myanmar military is no longer the only armed force exercising power over Rohingya communities.

The United League of Arakan and its armed wing, the Arakan Army (ULA/AA), became major military and administrative authorities in Rakhine State as fighting resumed in November 2023. The historical development of that authority is addressed in Section II.^[3]

For many Rohingya, this change did not bring the security they had hoped for. Instead, reports began to emerge of killings, detention, forced labor, displacement, property confiscation, and restrictions on movement. Human rights organizations have documented serious allegations against AA fighters and authorities, particularly during and after the military offensive of 2024. These allegations are not limited to isolated acts committed during combat. Some concern the way Rohingya communities have been treated after the AA gained control of their villages.^[4]

The reported May 2024 killings at Hoyyar Siri are central to this report; the underlying evidence and the AA response are examined in Section VII.^[5]

Other reported abuses include attacks on people fleeing toward the Naf River, detention, forced labor, and restrictions on movement. The Naf River attacks are documented, while attribution to the AA remains disputed despite Rohingya eyewitness accounts implicating it.^[6]

The report also considers whether restrictions on return and changes to Rohingya landholdings are connected to the violence, as examined in Section IV.^[7]

Responsibility is assessed by actor and incident. The Myanmar military and Rohingya armed groups have also been involved in the conflict; control of territory alone does not establish who committed a particular abuse.^[8]

This paper examines the conduct of the ULA/AA toward Rohingya civilians from its establishment in 2009 through 25 October 2026, with particular attention to the period following November 2023. It draws on United Nations investigations, human rights reports, witness testimony, local reporting, and public statements by the AA. The analysis considers whether documented acts form part of a widespread or systematic attack against Rohingya civilians, which is central to crimes against humanity.

The central argument is that the evidence amounts to crimes against humanity committed by AA personnel against Rohingya civilians. 

The purpose is not to transfer responsibility for the Rohingya crisis from the Myanmar military to the AA. It is to examine the responsibility of each actor based on its own conduct. The Rohingya should not have to endure persecution by one armed authority simply because another armed authority was responsible for earlier atrocities.

II. The ULA/AA and the Rohingya, 2009-2026

2.1. The Formation of the Arakan Army, 2009–2017

The Arakan Army (AA) was established on 10 April 2009 by Twan Mrat Naing and a small group of young Rakhine men in Kachin State, near Myanmar's border with China. With support from the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the group received military training and began building its armed forces. Its stated objective was to restore political autonomy and self-determination for the people of Arakan, the historical name for Rakhine State. The movement developed around the idea of the Way of Rakhita, which places Rakhine national identity and political aspirations at the center of its struggle.^[9]

The AA did not begin as a major military force in Rakhine State. During its early years, it operated mainly alongside other ethnic armed organizations in northern Myanmar. It gradually moved fighters toward Chin and Rakhine States, and by 2015 had begun confronting the Myanmar military closer to its intended territory. Its political wing, the United League of Arakan (ULA), became responsible for advancing the movement's political objectives and developing relationships with other armed and political organizations.^[10]

This early history matters because the AA's political vision developed in a region where the Rohingya had already been subjected to decades of discrimination. Although Rohingya and ethnic Rakhine communities have lived in the same region for generations, relations between them have been shaped by competing historical claims, communal violence, and government policies that denied Rohingya identity and citizenship.

The mass violence of 2012 deepened these divisions. Thousands of Rohingya were displaced into camps, while restrictions on movement and access to basic services became increasingly severe. In 2017, the Myanmar military launched operations that killed Rohingya civilians, destroyed villages, and drove more than 700,000 people into Bangladesh. These events took place while the AA was still expanding its military presence. Therefore the responsibility for those atrocities should not be transferred to the AA without evidence.^[11]

There is also limited verified evidence of direct AA attacks against Rohingya civilians between 2009 and 2017. This does not mean the group's early political views or relations with Rohingya communities are irrelevant. It means the historical record must be treated carefully. The later allegations against the AA cannot be used to invent an earlier history of crimes that has not been documented.

The more important question is how the AA's political ideas and military growth influenced its treatment of Rohingya communities once it gained control over their lives.

2.2. Military Expansion and the Emergence of Parallel Authority, 2018-2022

The AA's position changed significantly after fighting with the Myanmar military intensified in late 2018. The conflict spread across parts of Rakhine and southern Chin States, causing civilian deaths, displacement, and disruption to essential services. By November 2020, the two sides had reached an informal ceasefire, ending nearly two years of intense fighting.^[12]

The ceasefire created an opportunity for the AA to expand its influence beyond military operations. Rather than relying only on armed control, the ULA began developing administrative and judicial institutions in areas where Myanmar government authority had weakened.^[13]

This marked an important change. For the Rohingya, this development created both uncertainty and potential risk. They had already lived for decades under a system that denied them equal rights. A new actor could have dismantled those restrictions, but it could also preserve or introduce discriminatory practices of its own.

Fighting resumed in 2022, including in areas near the Bangladesh border. Rohingya communities were again caught between armed forces. Reports documented civilian displacement, restrictions on humanitarian assistance, and allegations of abuses by parties to the conflict. A United Nations human rights report also recorded an account that the AA had punished two of its soldiers for raping a Rohingya woman, reportedly sentencing them to 20 years in prison.^[14]

That case is significant for two reasons. First, it indicates that allegations of sexual violence involving AA personnel existed before the major offensive of 2023–2024. Second, the reported punishment suggests that the organization had disciplinary structures capable of responding to at least some misconduct. It does not show that sexual violence was an official AA policy. Nor does one reported disciplinary action demonstrate that the organization consistently investigated abuses or protected Rohingya civilians.

By the end of 2022, the AA had gained greater influence over parts of Rakhine State, including areas close to the Bangladesh border. Its growing military power and administrative reach meant that its treatment of civilians was becoming increasingly important.^[15]

2.3. The 2023-2024 Offensive and the Violence Against Rohingya Civilians

The conflict entered a new phase in November 2023, when the AA resumed major military operations against the Myanmar military. Over the following months, it captured military positions, towns, and territory across Rakhine State. Its advances eventually reached Rohingya-majority areas in Buthidaung and Maungdaw, where large civilian populations remained despite the displacement caused by earlier violence.^[16]

The military offensive took place in an already dangerous environment. The Myanmar military continued to use artillery, airstrikes, and other attacks that killed civilians. It also recruited Rohingya men and cooperated with some Rohingya armed groups against the AA. These developments increased tensions between communities and placed Rohingya civilians at risk of retaliation and collective punishment.^[17]

In April 2024, allegations of the abduction and killing of five Rohingya men emerged in Maungdaw. The underlying testimony and visual evidence are assessed in Section IV.1.^[18]

On 2 May 2024, the Hoyyar Siri massacre occurred in Buthidaung Township. Human Rights Watch subsequently documented the incident; its findings and the AA denial are assessed in Section IV.1.^[19]

The incident marked a critical stage in the offensive because of the reported deliberate targeting of Rohingya civilians.

Later in May 2024, extensive fires in Buthidaung displaced Rohingya residents. The disputed attribution of particular fires is addressed in Section IV.2.^[20]

In August 2024, Rohingya fleeing toward Bangladesh were attacked near the Naf River. Rohingya eyewitnesses implicated the AA, which denied responsibility; the evidence and its limitations are addressed in Sections IV.1 and VII.^[21]

These events provide the chronology for the incident-specific findings in Section IV.

2.4. The Consolidation of AA Control and Discriminatory treatment, 2025-2026

By 2025, the main concern was no longer limited to what happened during military operations. The AA had become the dominant armed group across much of Rakhine State, including areas where large numbers of Rohingya continued to live. It controlled territory, maintained armed forces, operated administrative institutions, and exercised power over civilian communities. This created a new situation in which how power holders treated Rohingya people depended increasingly on decisions made by the ULA/AA.^[22]

By 2025, investigations reported restrictions on movement, detention, and coercive labor under AA authority. Section III examines the individual practices and their supporting evidence.^[23]

The reported abuses were not confined to combat operations; some concerned civilians living under established AA administration.^[24]

Land seizure and prevention of return also became significant concerns. The detailed evidence, including reported settlement construction on Rohingya land, is considered in Section IV.8.^[25]

These land practices raise questions about whether displacement has become a permanent feature of AA policy, a conclusion examined through the evidence in Sections IV.2 and IV.8.^[26]

Accounts of the detention and abuse of Rohingya returnees from Bangladesh are assessed in Sections IV.3 and IV.4.^[27]

OHCHR reporting covering June 2025 to May 2026 placed allegations against the AA and Myanmar military in a broader pattern of serious violations.^[28]

These accounts raise questions about the coordination of abuses and the knowledge of senior officials, addressed in Sections IV and VI.

The AA disputes multiple allegations and invokes security concerns. Its responses are examined alongside the competing evidence in Section VI.^[29]

By October 2026, the AA exercised extensive authority over Rohingya communities, making its treatment of civilians central to the legal assessment.

The difference is essential to the legal analysis. The AA's stated political origins alone do not establish criminal intent. Its military victories are not crimes in themselves. The relevant evidence lies in how its members treated civilians, how abuses were repeated or organized, and how Rohingya were targeted because of their identity.

III. Methodology, Evidence and Attribution Standards

This paper examines reported crimes and human rights abuses committed by the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA) against Rohingya civilians between April 2009 and 25 October 2026. It draws on publicly available evidence to establish what happened, who may be responsible, and whether the documented conduct could amount to crimes against humanity under international law.

Google search engine, citation generator, claude, and grok ai were used to prepare this final report.

The analysis focuses on the period from November 2023 onward, when the AA expanded its control over Rohingya-majority areas of northern Rakhine State. Earlier events are included where they help explain the organization's development, its relationship with Rohingya communities, or previous allegations against its members.

3.1. Sources and Collection of Evidence

The research draws on United Nations investigations, reports by independent human rights organizations, local journalism, survivor testimony, and public statements by the AA.

Particular weight is given to investigations by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM), Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and Fortify Rights. These organizations have documented abuses through interviews, field investigations, visual evidence, and other forms of verification. Their findings provide an important foundation.

Reports by Rohingya community organizations and local media are also included. Sources such as Kaladan Press Network, Rohingya Khobor, Arakan Now, and the Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK have reported incidents that received little attention from international media. Their reporting is particularly useful for identifying affected villages, individual victims, detention cases, forced labor demands, and restrictions imposed by local authorities.

These sources are not automatically treated as either more or less reliable because of the communities they represent. Instead, the paper considers whether they identify witnesses, provide dates and locations, describe how information was obtained, and offer evidence that can be checked against other accounts.

The paper also examines statements by AA representatives, including denials, explanations of military operations, public commitments to civilian protection, and reports of disciplinary action against AA personnel. These statements are necessary for assessing competing accounts and determining whether the organization acknowledged, rejected, investigated, or attempted to prevent particular abuses.

3.2. Assessing the Reliability of Evidence

Not all reports are supported by the same level of evidence. Some incidents have been investigated through multiple witness interviews, satellite imagery, and verified photographs or videos. Others are known primarily through a single witness, local news report, or social-media post.

The paper therefore distinguishes between findings supported by several independent forms of evidence, credible but not fully corroborated allegations, and cases in which responsibility remains unknown.

The Hoyyar Siri investigation illustrates the stronger end of the evidence spectrum because it combined eyewitness interviews with visual and satellite material. Section IV.1 evaluates its findings.^[30]

The Naf River attacks illustrate the need to distinguish the occurrence of violence from the identification of its perpetrator. Rohingya eyewitnesses implicated the AA, which denied responsibility.

The same caution applies to incidents reported by several news outlets that rely on one original account. Repetition does not create independent confirmation. Where multiple publications reproduce the same testimony or organizational statement, they are treated as a single underlying source unless they conducted separate investigations.

3.3. Establishing Responsibility for Individual Incidents

Rakhine State has been affected by several armed actors, including the Myanmar military, the AA, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), and the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO). Their operations have sometimes taken place in the same areas and during the same periods. This makes accurate attribution essential.

The paper considers witness identification of perpetrators, uniforms and insignia, the location of armed positions, weapons used, control over detention facilities, orders issued by authorities, and any available visual or documentary evidence.

The paper also distinguishes between crimes committed by individual AA fighters and abuses that may reflect wider organizational practices. Repeated demands for forced labor, recruitment quotas, movement permits, or payments provide evidence of an organized system, particularly because similar practices are reported across several villages. 

3.4. Applying the Legal Standards

Crimes against humanity require more than proof that individual abuses occurred. Under Article 7 of the Rome Statute, the acts must form part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population. The perpetrator must know that the conduct is connected to that attack. The Rome Statute also requires the attack to be carried out in furtherance of a state or organizational policy. An attack in this legal sense does not have to be a conventional military operation.^[31]

The paper therefore examines whether killings, detention, forced displacement, torture, sexual violence, and persecution were connected through a wider pattern of conduct. It considers the number of incidents, their geographic distribution, the role of AA personnel, the role of their local administrators, and whether similar practices continued after the organization gained territorial control.

The analysis also considers victim selection, discriminatory statements, the geographical spread of conduct, and alternative explanations relevant to the Article 7 elements.

Forced displacement and land confiscation are particularly important to assess carefully. These practices support findings of persecution or forcible transfer.

The paper does not treat an allegation, an NGO finding, and a criminal conviction as equivalent. Its conclusions identify the strength of the evidence and whether it supports further investigation or a stronger legal finding.

3.5. Limitations and Protection of Witnesses

Independent access to many affected areas of Rakhine State remains severely restricted. Much of the available information comes from survivors who fled to Bangladesh, residents communicating remotely, local journalists, and organizations conducting investigations outside Myanmar.

These conditions create several limitations. Some witnesses cannot safely speak publicly. Others may have difficulty identifying armed personnel during chaotic fighting. Dates and casualty figures may differ between accounts. Destroyed villages and inaccessible detention sites make physical verification difficult.

The absence of public documentation does not necessarily mean an abuse did not occur. Equally, an allegation cannot be treated as proved simply because independent verification is difficult.

The research follows the principles of the Berkeley Protocol on Digital Open Source Investigations, developed by the UN Human Rights Office and the Human Rights Center at the University of California, Berkeley. These principles emphasize careful verification, preservation of original material, transparent methods, and protection of people who provide evidence.^[32]

This paper is a review of existing public evidence, not an independent field investigation. Its findings depend on the quality and limits of the underlying sources. Where evidence is incomplete or disputed, those limits are stated rather than concealed.

The purpose of this approach is to ensure that the allegations against the AA are assessed fairly and rigorously. Serious crimes must be investigated regardless of who commits them. Establishing responsibility requires evidence that can withstand scrutiny, especially when the findings may contribute to future international accountability proceedings.

IV. Documented Patterns of AA Crimes Against Rohingya Civilians

4.1. Mass Killings and Deliberate Attacks on Civilians

The most serious report against the Arakan Army (AA) concerns the deliberate killing of Rohingya civilians. During its military offensive in northern Rakhine State in 2024, several incidents were reported in which Rohingya men, women, and children were killed while attempting to escape fighting, remaining in their villages, or being held by armed personnel. Some of these incidents have since been examined through survivor interviews, photographs, videos, and satellite imagery. Others remain difficult to verify because investigators could not enter the affected areas.

The distinction matters. Not every civilian death during the fighting can be attributed to the AA. The Myanmar military continued to carry out artillery and air attacks, while Rohingya armed groups also participated in the conflict. But investigations by the United Nations, Human Rights Watch, and Fortify Rights provide substantial evidence implicating AA personnel in specific killings. Taken together, these findings indicate that the violence wasn’t limited to individual incidents but formed part of a broader attack against Rohingya civilians.^[33]

The killing and beheading of five Rohingya men in Maungdaw, April 2024

One of the earliest documented cases during the AA's 2024 offensive occurred on 17 April in northern Maungdaw Township. Five Rohingya men were reportedly detained by AA fighters near Abuja Hamlet in the Tha Yet Oak village tract. Their bodies were later discovered in a fish pond near Rohingya Daung village, approximately one mile from where they had been taken.

Fortify Rights investigated the incident and interviewed a witness who described seeing armed AA personnel capture the men. According to the witness, the fighters beat the detainees, tied their hands, and took them away. Less than a week later, villagers found their bodies. Four had been beheaded, while the bodies showed other signs of violence. Fortify Rights also reviewed an 18-second mobile phone video showing five bodies in a pond, four without heads.^[34]

The United Nations independently documented claims about the same incident. In its annual update on Myanmar's human rights situation in 2024, OHCHR reported that witnesses consistently identified the AA as responsible for the abductions and killings. The AA denied the allegations and blamed the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA).^[35]

This case is particularly serious because the victims were reportedly captured alive before their bodies were found mutilated. The witness account of the detention, combined with the subsequent discovery of the bodies and the video evidence, supports an investigation into unlawful killing and torture.

The evidence does not yet establish who gave the orders or whether the killings were part of an official AA policy. Still, the circumstances go beyond the ordinary risks of civilian casualties during combat.

The case also illustrates a recurring problem in northern Rakhine: the difficulty of obtaining justice when armed groups control the territory where the alleged crimes occurred. Families may know that their relatives were taken away but have no independent authority to investigate their deaths.

The Hoyyar Siri massacre, 2 May 2024

The strongest publicly documented case of alleged mass killing by AA arm personnel occurred in Hoyyar Siri village, known in Burmese as Htan Shauk Khan, in Buthidaung Township.

On 2 May 2024, fighting intensified near the village as the AA advanced against two nearby Myanmar military positions. Hoyyar Siri had become a place of refuge for Rohingya families displaced from surrounding villages. Many believed they would be safer there because the village had survived earlier waves of violence.

Instead, residents described an attack in which AA fighters fired on civilians attempting to escape. Some villagers reportedly carried white flags to show that they were not combatants. Witnesses said the Arakan Army continued shooting as people turned back or tried to find shelter.^[36]

In May 2026, Human Rights Watch published a detailed investigation based on interviews with 41 witnesses, satellite imagery, photographs, and verified videos. The organization compiled the names of more than 170 villagers reported killed or missing, including approximately 90 children. It concluded that the Arakan Army had deliberately attacked Rohingya civilians and committed serious violations amounting to war crimes.^[37]

The witness accounts describe violence directed at people who were not taking part in fighting. One survivor told Human Rights Watch that his son was shot first, followed by his wife and daughters. Another described Arakan Army members opening fire on villagers gathered in a paddy field near a mosque. According to her account, AA continued shooting at her husband after he had already been wounded.^[38]

These accounts are important because they describe more than an attack in which civilians happened to be present. They allege that AA members could see civilians, including women and children, and continued shooting.

Human Rights Watch also examined visual evidence showing human remains at several locations in the village. Satellite imagery supported witness accounts of extensive destruction and the subsequent burning of Hoyyar Siri. The organization found evidence of looting, unlawful detention, torture, and destroying civilian property connected to the attack.^[39]

The investigation further documented allegations that survivors were denied freedom of movement and later relocated to a nearby camp. Some reported being forced to work for AA authorities and living without adequate food or medical care. These later developments are relevant because they suggest that the consequences of the attack did not end when the shooting stopped.

The AA rejected the findings. In its written response to Human Rights Watch, the ULA maintained that its forces had followed the laws of war, taken precautions to protect civilians, and coordinated evacuations with Muslim community leaders. It denied that AA personnel had committed the alleged violations.^[40]

Human Rights Watch's investigation is unusually detailed, combining eyewitness testimony with independent visual analysis. The investigation provides strong, independently corroborated evidence that AA personnel deliberately killed Rohingya civilians at Hoyyar Siri. Also, the figure of more than 170 includes people reported missing, not only those whose deaths have been individually confirmed.

The Hoyyar Siri massacre is central to this paper for three reasons.

First, the reported victims included many children and other civilians who were not participating in hostilities. Second, witnesses described direct shooting by the Arakan Army rather than deaths caused solely by indiscriminate shelling. Third, the alleged destruction of the village and restrictions imposed on survivors indicated that the violence was followed by measures that prevented the community from recovering or returning.

These circumstances are relevant to the investigation of murder, persecution, forcible transfer, and other possible crimes against humanity.

Other killings and deaths following AA detention

The Hoyyar Siri massacre was not the only incident in which Rohingya civilians were killed by the Arakan Army. Fortify Rights documented several cases involving people taken from their homes or villages by the Arakan Army and later found dead.

In one case, a Rohingya man identified by Ahmed told investigators that Arakan Army fighters abducted his brother during Ramadan in March 2025. According to Ahmed, between 10 and 15 armed men wearing Arakan Army uniforms entered the family's home and forcibly took his brother away. Family members attempted to stop them. Ahmed later found his brother's decapitated body in a forest, inside an empty rice sack.^[41]

In another case, a man from Foteh Ali Fara village in Buthidaung Township described the abduction of his brother in January 2024. He said approximately 15 Arakan Army members came to the family's home at night and took his brother away without explaining the reason. About two months later, the family found his body among 12 male bodies in a field near Boriyong village. The witness described bruising and injuries on the bodies, including what appeared to be gunshot wounds on some victims.^[42]

These accounts point to a particularly concerning pattern: people allegedly abducted by the Arakan Army, followed by deaths or discoveries of bodies bearing signs of violence. The circumstances indicate unlawful detention, torture, disappearance, and killing, while the specific legal elements require individual assessment.

The Naf River attacks, 5–6 August 2024

Another major incident occurred in early August 2024, as thousands of Rohingya attempted to flee fighting in Maungdaw Township and cross the Naf River into Bangladesh.

On 5 August, civilians gathered near the river were struck by attacks involving armed drones. Witnesses described large numbers of casualties, including women and children. Further attacks were reported on 6 August.

The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Myanmar reported allegations that approximately 200 Rohingya civilians had been killed in an attack near the river on 5 August. Witnesses said drones had approached from the direction of Arakan Army positions. The Arakan Army denied responsibility and blamed the Myanmar military.^[43]

OHCHR subsequently reported that multiple interviewees attributed the drone attacks to the Arakan Army because the drones appeared to come from areas under its control. One survivor described a boat carrying 50 people being struck, killing 38, including four children.^[44]

Deliberately attacking civilians fleeing toward Bangladesh constitute a grave violation of international humanitarian law. That the victims were attempting to escape, rather than participate in hostilities, is central to assessing the nature of the attacks.

4.2. Burning and Destruction of Rohingya Villages

Destroying Rohingya homes and villages has been one of the most serious consequences of the Arakan Army's (AA) military expansion in northern Rakhine State. Since 2024, large areas of Rohingya settlements have been burned, damaged, or cleared. Thousands of families have lost their homes, while others could not return to their villages after the fighting ended. Some of the destruction occurred during battles between the AA and the Myanmar military. Other incidents have been linked by witnesses to deliberate attacks by AA fighters against Rohingya civilian areas.

The evidence indicates the destruction was not limited to military operations, some villages were deliberately targeted to remove their Rohingya populations. The difference matters because the intentional destruction of civilian homes, when not justified by military necessity, constitute a war crime. When carried out as part of a wider attack against civilians, it also contributes to crimes against humanity, including persecution and forcible transfer.^[45]

The burning of Buthidaung, May 2024

Buthidaung Township became one of the main centers of fighting during the AA's offensive in 2024. As the organization advanced toward the town, the Myanmar military withdrew from several positions, while large numbers of Rohingya civilians remained in surrounding neighborhoods and villages.

Between 17 and 21 May 2024, fires destroyed extensive parts of Buthidaung town. Satellite imagery reviewed by independent investigators confirmed widespread damage, including destroying residential neighborhoods. Witnesses reported that armed AA personnel ordered Rohingya residents to leave their homes before fires spread through the area. Some said AA members subsequently burned buildings and prevented families from returning.^[46]

The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed serious concern about the destruction. OHCHR reported that the Arakan Army had forced Rohingya civilians to leave Buthidaung and had been involved in burning Rohingya homes. Also, the UN acknowledged the presence of competing accounts and the difficulty of establishing responsibility for every fire during the fighting.^[47]

The AA rejected accusations that its forces deliberately burned the town. Its representatives argued that the Myanmar military and allied armed groups were responsible for the destruction and accused the military of using Rohingya civilians as part of its operations. The organization also maintained that it had warned civilians to evacuate areas affected by fighting.^[48]

These competing accounts require careful examination. The Myanmar military had a documented history of burning Rohingya villages, and its operations continued to endanger civilians during the 2024 offensive. There were also reports that the military and allied Rohingya armed groups had burned ethnic Rakhine homes in Buthidaung before the AA captured the town. Those incidents must not be confused with allegations of subsequent destruction of Rohingya neighborhoods.

Still, witness testimony and satellite evidence raise substantial concerns about AA involvement in at least some of the destruction. The central issue is not simply whether buildings burned during the fighting. It is whether civilians were deliberately forced out and whether their homes were destroyed after they had left, making their displacement more difficult to reverse.

For families who had already survived earlier waves of persecution, the loss of their homes represented another major displacement. Many had nowhere safe to go. Some fled toward Maungdaw, while others sought shelter in nearby villages or temporary displacement sites.

The destruction of Hoyyar Siri after the massacre

destroying Hoyyar Siri village following the 2 May 2024 massacre provides a particularly important example of how direct violence and property destruction are connected.

Human Rights Watch's 2026 investigation found that the village was extensively damaged after the killings. Satellite imagery and witness accounts documented the burning of homes and destroying civilian property. Survivors described losing not only family members but also houses, food supplies, and possessions.^[49]

According to the investigation, AA members were implicated in the attack on civilians and the subsequent destruction of the village. Witnesses also described restrictions on survivors, including their movement and ability to return.

The sequence of events is important. When civilians are killed or forced to flee and their homes are then destroyed, the consequences extend beyond the initial attack. Survivors may be left without shelter, food, land, or the means to rebuild their lives. When the destruction is deliberate, it indicates an effort to prevent the community from returning.

The evidence from Hoyyar Siri is particularly relevant because the killings and destruction occurred in the same location and during the same period. It therefore indicates that these acts were connected, they are not unrelated incidents.

Destruction in Rohingya Daung, Keya Zinga Para, and surrounding villages

Reports of village destruction were not limited to Buthidaung town and Hoyyar Siri. During the AA's advance through northern Rakhine, Rohingya communities in Rohingya Daung, Keya Zinga Para, and other settlements reported fires, attacks, and displacement.

Fortify Rights documented allegations of abuses in villages around Buthidaung and Maungdaw, including the killing of civilians, forced displacement, and destruction of property. United Nations reporting also described extensive damage to Rohingya residential areas during the 2024 conflict.^[50]

The evidence varies between locations. Some villages have been documented through satellite imagery, while others are known mainly through residents' accounts or local reporting. In several cases, the destruction occurred while both the AA and Myanmar military were conducting operations nearby.

The paper therefore does not attribute every destroyed Rohingya house or village to the AA. But the scale of destruction is relevant to understanding the conditions faced by Rohingya civilians. The cumulative loss of housing, agricultural land, and village infrastructure has made return increasingly difficult.

4.3. Forced Displacement and Prevention of Return

For many Rohingya families in northern Rakhine State, displacement has become a repeated experience. Some fled the Myanmar military's operations in 2017. Others remained in their villages but were forced to move when fighting between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army (AA) intensified in late 2023. As the AA captured territory in 2024, thousands of Rohingya fled again. Some crossed into Bangladesh, while others sought safety in nearby villages or temporary camps.

The problem did not end when the fighting stopped. Human rights investigations show that some displaced Rohingya were prevented from returning to their homes, while others were placed in camps where they faced restrictions on movement, work, and access to basic services. Reports also describe families being detained after returning from Bangladesh and civilians being pressured to leave areas under Arakan Army control.^[51]

These developments raise questions about the purpose of the displacement. Civilians may flee because of fighting, but displacement becomes a different legal concern when an armed group deliberately removes people, prevents them from returning without a lawful justification, or impose conditions that leave them with no realistic choice but to leave. The evidence suggests that this kind of coercion is taking place under AA control.

Forced displacement during the 2024 military offensive

The renewed conflict in November 2023 placed Rohingya communities between the Myanmar military and the advancing AA. Both sides were accused of serious abuses against civilians. The Myanmar military continued airstrikes and artillery attacks, while AA members were accused of killings, burning villages, and forcing residents to leave areas they captured.

By July 2025, according to figures cited in an OHCHR report, approximately 150,000 Rohingya had fled to Bangladesh during the preceding 18 months. Another 88,100 Rohingya had been displaced within northern Rakhine since November 2023, while approximately 140,000 remained displaced in central Rakhine. These figures describe different populations and periods and should not be added together as a single count of people displaced by the Arakan Army.^[52]

The scale of the displacement shows the severity of the crisis. Some families fled fighting between armed groups and some reported direct threats or violence by AA personnel.

Human Rights Watch interviewed Rohingya refugees who described being displaced repeatedly as the conflict moved through their communities. One 62-year-old man said that he, his wife, and their two children had been displaced five times within approximately one year. Even when the family found temporary shelter, restrictions on movement made it difficult to obtain food, work, or reach safer areas.^[53]

For these families, displacement was not a single event. Each move meant losing access to housing, food, income, and community support. People who escaped one danger often found themselves exposed to another.

The repeated movement of civilians also made it harder to establish where families had originally lived and what happened to their property. This became particularly important when the AA established control over villages that residents had already abandoned.

The confinement of Hoyyar Siri survivors in Hnget Thay camp

How the Arakan Army treated survivors from Hoyyar Siri provides one of the clearest documented examples of displacement continuing after the immediate violence ended.

Following the 2 May 2024 massacre, surviving villagers fled in different directions. Some reached the U Hla Hpay area, where Human Rights Watch reported that AA members intercepted them, detained them, and took their money and jewelry. Other survivors were forced to relocate to Nassawr Para, also known as Hnget Thay, a makeshift camp approximately three kilometers south of Hoyyar Siri.^[54]

Human Rights Watch found that survivors living in the camp faced serious restrictions on their freedom of movement. Residents described inadequate food and medical care, along with demands for forced labor. Satellite imagery showed that Hoyyar Siri had been burned and was no longer habitable. According to the investigation, survivors had not been able to return to live in their village two years after the massacre.

The AA acknowledged that residents could not return but cited landmines and unexploded ordnance as the reason. The organization also reportedly constructed structures in the former village area, including what Human Rights Watch identified as a possible checkpoint and cattle sheds.^[55]

The presence of landmines and unexploded ordnance is a genuine safety concern in conflict-affected areas. Restricting access to dangerous land may be justified while those threats remain. But the explanation needs to be examined against how AA treated displaced residents and the subsequent use of their property.

If an area is too dangerous for its original residents to return, why are new structures being built there, who is permitted to enter, and whether any credible effort is being made to remove the hazards and restore civilian access?

The conditions reported in Hnget Thay are also significant. Survivors who had already lost relatives and homes allegedly remained under the control of the same armed organization implicated in the original attack. Their movement was restricted, and some were compelled to work.

This combination of violence, forced relocation, and continuing control over survivors provides a strong basis indicating their displacement formed part of a wider attack against Rohingya civilians.

Rohingya prevented from returning to their villages

The difficulty of returning home was not limited to Hoyyar Siri.

In its report prepared for the September 2025 United Nations high-level conference on Myanmar, OHCHR described a troubling difference between displaced Rohingya in Maungdaw and those from rural Buthidaung.

The report says many displaced Rohingya in Maungdaw appeared to have returned to their places of origin. Returns had also occurred in Maungdaw and Buthidaung towns. But Rohingya displaced from rural areas of Buthidaung overwhelmingly reported that they could not return to their original villages.^[56]

The difference matters because it shows that return was not uniformly prohibited across all AA-controlled territory. The restrictions appeared to vary by location. Investigating why some communities were allowed to return while others were excluded is essential to determining whether these decisions reflected genuine security concerns, military use of land, discriminatory treatment, or a broader policy of displacement.

The same OHCHR report documented that Rohingya returning months after their displacement found homes and mosques destroyed and building materials removed. Some families who managed to return had to live in temporary bamboo and tarpaulin shelters. They were reportedly forbidden from constructing more permanent homes, sometimes even on land they owned.^[57]

Such restrictions prevent displaced families from rebuilding their lives. A household may physically return to its village but remain unable to restore its home, earn a living, or recover its property.

Where these conditions are imposed by an armed group without adequate justification, they amount to continued coercion rather than a genuine opportunity for return.

The detention and forced removal of Rohingya returnees

How the Arakan Army treated Rohingya who attempted to return from Bangladesh provides further evidence that displacement has been reinforced through detention and intimidation.

In February 2026, Kaladan Press Network published testimony from former detainees belonging to 22 Rohingya families, approximately 100 people, who had returned to Maungdaw Township in June 2025. The families came from Pyan Taw Pyin, Shwe Zar, and Nyaung Chaung villages. According to the investigation, they had fled to Bangladesh during the 2024 fighting and later sought permission to return to their homes.^[58]

One former detainee said the families contacted village AA members and submitted identification documents before returning. Their requests were reportedly approved by the AA.

But shortly after their arrival, they were allegedly summoned to an AA facility in Alay Than Kyaw, questioned, and transferred to detention in Maungdaw town. The witness reported that a local court subsequently sentenced the returnees, including women and children, to three months in prison for crossing the border illegally.

Former detainees described beatings, forced labor, inadequate food, and sexual violence against women. They also alleged that AA members demanded two million kyat per person before release. Some detainees were reportedly held for 45 days, while others remained for the full three months. According to the testimony, some were transported back to Bangladesh by boats operated by the AA.^[59]

Kaladan Press stated that it could not independently verify these allegations, and the AA had not publicly responded to the specific claims. They must therefore be treated as serious but not fully corroborated allegations.

Still, the reported sequence raises important questions. The families allegedly received permission to return, were then detained for entering Myanmar, and were eventually sent back to Bangladesh. This suggests that returnees were not simply denied entry but subjected to punishment after attempting to resume life in their own communities.

The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Myanmar also reported in 2026 that some Rohingya returning from Bangladesh had been abducted and detained by the Arakan Army. The Special Rapporteur documented additional allegations that AA members threatened or pressured Rohingya civilians to leave Rakhine State, sometimes requiring them to pay fees to travel to Bangladesh.^[60]

These reports do not establish that every Rohingya returnee was detained but provide grounds indicating that the detention and forced removal were used to discourage Rohingya families from returning to particular areas by the Arakan Army.

Restrictions that make remaining in Rakhine increasingly difficult

Not all displacement begins with an explicit order to leave. Families may also be forced to move when those in power make ordinary life impossible.

Human Rights Watch reported in July 2025 that Rohingya residents under AA control faced severe restrictions on movement and livelihoods. Interviewees said they could not freely travel between villages, fish, farm, or work without permission. Some described serious food shortages that forced families to depend on assistance from neighbors.^[61]

Residents reported paying between 3,000 and 5,000 kyat for travel permits that were valid for only one day. These permits reportedly required approval from local Rohingya administrators and AA or ULA members.^[62]

A resident described the consequences of violating curfew restrictions, alleging that people found outside their homes could be arrested and that their families sometimes did not know where they had been taken.^[63]

The restrictions had practical consequences. Families who could not farm lost access to food and income. Those unable to travel could not easily seek medical treatment, visit relatives, or find work elsewhere. The Myanmar military's restrictions on humanitarian access further worsened the situation, making it important to distinguish the effects of AA policies from the wider consequences of the war.^[64]

The UN Special Rapporteur similarly reported that Rohingya under AA control faced restrictions on fishing, farming, travel, and movement outside displacement camps. These practices were contributing to severe food insecurity.^[65]

When considered separately, an individual permit requirement or curfew may not establish a crime. Arm groups may impose temporary security measures in areas affected by fighting. But restrictions become far more concerning when they are discriminatory, prolonged, enforced through arbitrary detention, or prevent an already vulnerable population from meeting its basic needs.

The question is whether the AA imposed these measures for genuine and proportionate security reasons or used them to control, punish, or pressure Rohingya communities.

New allegations of village-wide expulsion, October 2026

On 14 October 2026, Rohingya Monitor reported allegations that AA personnel had ordered residents of Ah Nauk Pyin village, also known as Muzai Fara, in Rathedaung Township, to leave by 17 October. The outlet reported that 51 Rohingya residents had been abducted between September and 10 October and that one detainee had been killed.^[66]

The report identifies a specific village, deadline, number of alleged detainees, and reported death. But the publicly available reporting reviewed for this paper does not independently establish whether the expulsion order was carried out, the fate of all detainees, or the AA's response.

It’s a recent allegation, if corroborated, the reported threat to remove an entire Rohingya village is forcible transfer and ethnic persecution as it’s connected to the detention of residents and the population was being targeted because of its identity.

4.4. Arbitrary Detention, Enforced Disappearance, and Torture

The detention of Rohingya civilians has become another serious concern in areas controlled by the Arakan Army (AA). Since 2024, survivors and human rights organizations have reported cases of people being taken from their homes, detained without clear charges, beaten, tortured, and held without contact with their families. Some were released after paying money or performing forced labor. Others disappeared, and their relatives later discovered their bodies or remained unable to determine what had happened to them.

These reports suggest that detention has served purposes beyond ordinary arm movement. Sometimes, Rohingya were reportedly accused of supporting the Myanmar military or Rohingya armed groups. In others, they were detained for traveling without permission, returning from Bangladesh, refusing demands from AA, or reasons that were never explained.^[67]

The evidence is important because detention involves direct control over a person's safety and freedom. When armed personnel take someone into custody, they become responsible for that person's treatment. If the detainee is subsequently tortured, disappears, or is found dead, it raises serious questions on what happened during detention and who had authority over the facility or personnel involved.

Detention and torture during the 2024 offensive

Fortify Rights documented allegations of arbitrary detention and torture involving AA personnel in Buthidaung and Maungdaw townships. Its July 2025 investigation included testimony from Rohingya survivors who described being abducted, beaten, and held in AA-controlled facilities.

One survivor, identified as Shofiq, reported that AA fighters detained him in January 2024 and held him until November of that year. During his detention, he said he was beaten and tortured. His account describes prolonged detention without meaningful legal protection and physical abuse by armed personnel.^[68]

The length of the reported detention is significant. A person held for several months without a clear legal process may be unable to contact relatives, challenge the reason for detention, or obtain independent medical assistance. When detention is accompanied by beatings or threats, the harm extends beyond the loss of freedom.

Fortify Rights also documented cases in which Rohingya men were reportedly taken from their homes and later found dead. As discussed in Section 4.1, witnesses from Foteh Ali Fara and other villages described the abduction of relatives by identified AA personnel, followed by the discovery of bodies bearing signs of violence.

The pattern deserves attention. Allegations of prolonged detention, torture, and deaths following abduction suggest that Rohingya civilians have faced serious risks after coming under AA control, even when they were not participating in fighting.

Detention under AA administration after territorial capture

As the AA gained control of more territory in 2024 and 2025, reports of detention increasingly concerned the enforcement of administrative rules rather than direct military operations.

Human Rights Watch reported in July 2025 that Rohingya residents faced arrest for violating movement restrictions or curfews. Interviewees described needing permission to travel between villages and fearing detention if they were found outside their homes without authorization.^[69]

One resident told Human Rights Watch that AA personnel could arrest people who violated the curfew and that families sometimes did not know where detainees had been taken. Other witnesses described being detained after accusations of supporting armed groups or failing to comply with demands from local authorities.

These accounts raise concerns about the absence of basic safeguards. Residents should be informed of the reasons for their detention and have a meaningful opportunity to challenge it. They should also be protected from torture and other ill-treatment, regardless of whether they are suspected of involvement with an armed group.

Security threats may justify lawful investigations and detention in some circumstances. But a general accusation that a person supports ARSA, RSO, or the Myanmar military does not establish individual guilt. Nor does it justify physical abuse, punishment without due process, or detention based solely on ethnic identity.

The reported involvement of village administrators is also important. In areas where Rohingya administrators were appointed or supervised by the AA, residents described being summoned, questioned, or required to comply with orders issued through local AA members.

If detention was repeatedly used to enforce movement restrictions, labor demands, or payments, it indicates an organized system rather than isolated misconduct by individual fighters.

Allegations of torture and physical abuse

Reports by Fortify Rights, Human Rights Watch, and Rohingya community organizations describe several forms of alleged torture and ill-treatment in AA custody.

Survivors reported being beaten with sticks or other objects, kicked, threatened, and held in harsh conditions. Some described being denied adequate food or medical care. Others alleged that detainees were forced to perform labor while under threat of punishment.^[70]

The repeated beatings, threats of death, prolonged confinement, and severe abuse meet the threshold of torture, particularly where they are used to punish, intimidate, or obtain information from detainees.

The reported treatment of Rohingya civilians also raises questions about discrimination. Because the detainees were selected or punished because they were Rohingya, or because the Rohingya faced harsher treatment than other communities under similar circumstances, this supported an investigation into persecution.

Disappearances and families left without answers

Some of the most disturbing accounts concern people who were taken away and never returned.

Fortify Rights documented cases in which Rohingya men were reportedly abducted by AA personnel and later found dead. In other cases, relatives could not determine where detainees had been taken or whether they were still alive.^[71]

For families, the uncertainty can continue long after the initial arrest. Without access to detention records or an independent authority, relatives may be unable to confirm whether a missing person is being held, has been transferred, or has died.

These cases require careful legal classification. A disappearance is not automatically the crime against humanity of enforced disappearance. Under Article 7 of the Rome Statute, that crime has specific requirements concerning the role of a state or political organization, deprivation of liberty, refusal to acknowledge detention or provide information. The intention to remove the person from legal protection for a prolonged period.^[72]

The ULA/AA's political and administrative structure makes its possible organizational involvement relevant, but each element must be established. The mere fact that a person is missing after an alleged AA arrest is not enough to prove every element of enforced disappearance.

Still, reports of detention without information to families provide a serious basis for further investigation.

Detention as a possible tool of persecution

The significance of these allegations lies not only in how AA members treated individual detainees but also in the possible purpose of detention across AA-controlled areas.

Reports describe Rohingya being arrested after violating movement restrictions, returning from Bangladesh, refusing demands, or being accused of supporting armed groups. Other accounts involve prolonged detention, physical abuse, and demands for money.

Because these practices are widespread and systematic, they could support an investigation into crimes against humanity, including imprisonment or other severe deprivation of liberty, torture, persecution, and enforced disappearance.

The evidence is particularly relevant where detention appears to have been used to control civilian behavior. Arrests connected to travel permits, labor demands, or return to villages may indicate that detention served as a means of enforcing broader restrictions on Rohingya communities.

The evidence provides substantial grounds to investigate the responsibility of commanders and administrative personnel who may have ordered, supervised, or knowingly allowed these practices.

4.5. Sexual and Gender-Based Violence

Sexual violence against Rohingya women and girls has been documented for many years in Myanmar. During the military's 2017 campaign, rape and other forms of sexual violence were used against Rohingya civilians on a large scale. Survivors described attacks that left lasting physical injuries, trauma, and fear. United Nations investigators later examined these crimes as part of the wider campaign against the Rohingya.

Recent evidence raises serious concerns that Rohingya women and girls are again facing sexual violence, this time in areas controlled by the Arakan Army (AA). Reports describe rape, gang rape, sexual threats, and abuse connected to detention, forced recruitment, and displacement. The allegations involve women and girls who were already living under severe restrictions, with little access to independent protection or justice.

Sexual violence is a serious crime in its own right. It also reveals how an armed organization exercises power over a civilian population. When women are threatened, detained, or assaulted because of their identity or their families' refusal to comply with orders, the consequences extend beyond the individual victim. Such acts can create fear throughout a community, discourage resistance, and force families to change how they live.

The evidence does not show that every reported assault was ordered by senior AA leaders. It does, but raise questions about the conduct of AA personnel, the protection available to Rohingya women, indicating sexual violence has become part of a wider pattern of coercion under AA control.^[73]

Early evidence of sexual violence involving AA personnel, 2022

Allegations of sexual violence involving AA personals existed before the organization's major military offensive of 2023–2024.

In September 2022, fighting between the AA and Myanmar military intensified around Gu Dar Pyin village in Buthidaung Township. Approximately 2,000 Rohingya were displaced, and many homes were reportedly destroyed. The United Nations received allegations that women and girls had experienced sexual violence by members of both Arakan Army and Myanmar military junta.

The same UN report recorded an important statement made by an AA spokesperson on 20 October 2022. According to OHCHR, the spokesperson of AA said that two AA soldiers had been sentenced to 20 years in prison for raping a Rohingya woman in Buthidaung Township.^[74]

This reported disciplinary action is significant. It indicates that the AA itself publicly acknowledged at least one case of rape involving its personnel. It also suggests that the organization had a process through which soldiers could be punished for misconduct.

But the public statement does not independently establish the details of the proceedings, whether the sentences were carried out, or whether the survivor received protection and support.

The case nevertheless demonstrates that allegations of sexual violence by AA personnel were not entirely new in 2024. It raises an important question about whether the organization took effective measures to prevent similar abuses as its forces expanded into areas with large Rohingya populations.

Sexual violence during the renewed conflict, 2023–2024

The resumption of fighting in November 2023 placed Rohingya women and girls at greater risk. Many families fled their villages with little food, money, or shelter. Others remained in areas where armed groups operated close to civilian homes.

The United Nations Secretary-General's report on conflict-related sexual violence, published in 2025, documented allegations that Rohingya and other ethnic minority women had been raped, gang-raped, and killed by members of both the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army during the renewed conflict in Rakhine State. The report also described sexual exploitation and trafficking affecting women and children fleeing Myanmar.^[75]

This is an important finding because it identifies both armed actors as subjects of reported sexual violence. It does not provide enough public detail to attribute every incident to a particular unit or commander.

Still, the report places the allegations against AA personnel within a wider pattern of conflict-related abuse that is serious enough to document.

The circumstances surrounding displacement increased the danger. Women who lost their homes often depended on unfamiliar people for transport, shelter, or food. Those separated from relatives had fewer ways to seek protection. Restrictions on movement and humanitarian assistance further reduced their access to medical care and confidential reporting services.

These conditions were caused by several actors and by the wider conflict. They cannot all be attributed to the AA. But where AA personnel directly controlled detention facilities, movement, or civilian access to services, their treatment of women and girls indicates sexual abuses committed by the members of Arakan Army.

Reported rape and sexual abuse in AA detention facilities

The strongest recent evidence concerning sexual violence under AA control comes from the Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK (BROUK).

On 14 May 2026, BROUK published Sexual Violence Against Rohingya Women and Girls: Emerging Patterns of Abuse in Arakan Army-Controlled Areas of Rakhine State. The briefing draws on information collected from Rohingya sources between May 2024 and April 2026, particularly in Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships.

BROUK documented allegations of rape, gang rape, threats of sexual violence, and abuse connected to arbitrary detention, forced recruitment, and restrictions imposed by the Arakan Army. The organization reported that sexual violence was increasingly associated with systems of detention and coercion rather than occurring only during active fighting.^[76]

The connection to detention is particularly concerning. Women held without contact with their families may have no way to report abuse or obtain medical care. Their relatives may not know where they are being held, who is responsible for their safety, or when they will be released.

BROUK also reported allegations of women being detained and sexually abused during recruitment operations. Its findings suggest that sexual violence have been used alongside threats, physical abuse, and other forms of intimidation.

In February 2026, before publishing the full briefing, BROUK President Tun Khin raised these concerns during an intervention at the United Nations Human Rights Council. He reported allegations that women detained by AA personnel in villages including Ywar Nyo Taung and Ngar Sar Kyu had been raped, physically abused, and subjected to demands for ransom.^[77]

These accounts identify specific locations and forms of abuse. They also raise questions about whether detention and sexual violence were connected to efforts to obtain money, enforce obedience, or punish families.

The evidence must still be treated carefully. BROUK's findings rely on information collected through Rohingya sources, and the briefing acknowledges that access restrictions and fear of retaliation limit documentation. The publicly available material does not establish the precise number of independently verified victims.

The consistency of the reported methods, detention, threats, physical abuse, and sexual violence, indicates that these acts were repeated across different locations under AA control.

Specific cases of sexual violence documented in 2024–2026

BROUK's May 2026 briefing provides several specific allegations that deserve closer examination.

The gang rape of a 22-year-old Rohingya woman in Maungdaw, 2024. BROUK documented an account in which seven Arakan Army members gang-raped a 22-year-old woman as she fled violence with her husband. The report says she was also beaten, and her husband was subsequently murdered. The case links alleged sexual violence to an attack on a displaced civilian family.^[78]

The rape of a woman fleeing Hari Fara. In another case, BROUK reported that a young Rohingya woman became separated from her family while escaping violence in the Hari Fara area. She was later found after allegedly being raped by multiple AA armed personals. The account illustrates the risks faced by women separated from relatives during displacement.⁶

The detention of approximately 15 women in Buthidaung, January 2026. BROUK reported that AA personnel arrested approximately 15 Rohingya women during night raids. Some were reportedly released after their families paid ransom. One released woman showed signs of physical and sexual abuse but was afraid to describe what had happened. The reported injuries are concerning, although the public account does not provide enough detail to establish every alleged act or identify individual perpetrators.^[79]

The death of a 15-year-old girl during transportation to an AA camp. BROUK documented an allegation that a Rohingya girl died after jumping from a moving vehicle while being transported to an AA camp following the arrest of women from her village. The report does not show that she was sexually assaulted. The incident is relevant because it illustrates the danger associated with alleged forced recruitment and detention of girls.^[80]

The rape of a married woman in northern Maungdaw, February 2026. BROUK reported that two AA members entered a Rohingya home, restrained a husband and wife, and raped the woman. She was reportedly left seriously injured. Unlike cases occurring during displacement, this assault took place inside a civilian home in an area under AA control.^[81]

These accounts are drawn primarily from BROUK's own documentation and earlier situation updates. The cases differ in location, date, and circumstances. Some involve women fleeing violence, while others concern detention, recruitment operations, or attacks inside homes. This range of settings is important as it indicatesthat the sexual violence was not confined to isolated battlefield incidents, it continued as the AA developed greater control over civilian life.

Forced recruitment and the growing danger to women and girls

BROUK's findings suggest that forced recruitment has created another source of insecurity for Rohingya women and girls.

According to its May 2026 briefing, AA authorities increasingly demanded recruits from Rohingya villages, including women. The organization documented reports involving recruitment lists, village quotas, raids, and the detention of women who were taken to AA facilities without contact with their families.^[82]

These reports are important because recruitment operations place armed personnel in direct contact with civilians, often inside their homes. Women taken to military facilities without clear procedures or independent monitoring may be particularly vulnerable to abuse.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights also reported in August 2026 that Rohingya girls had resorted to early marriage in the hope of avoiding forced recruitment. OHCHR described forced recruitment, detention, torture, and sexual and gender-based violence among the abuses affecting Rohingya under AA control.^[83]

Early marriage in this context should not be understood simply as a family preference. It may reflect the extreme choices families make when they believe their daughters are at risk of being taken away.

The evidence does not show that every detained woman was sexually assaulted. But the reported recruitment practices create conditions in which abuse occurs with complete impunity.

The absence of protection and accountability

Sexual violence is often difficult to document, particularly in communities where survivors face stigma, threats, and limited access to healthcare.

BROUK acknowledged that its findings represent only part of the problem. Survivors may be unwilling to speak because they fear retaliation from armed personnel, rejection by relatives, or further harm to their families. Restrictions on travel and communications also make it difficult for independent investigators to reach affected villages.^[84]

These barriers are especially serious where the organization accused of abuse also controls local security and detention facilities. Survivors may have no independent authority to approach, and their families may fear that filing a complaint will expose them to additional danger.

BROUK reported that it had found no publicly available evidence of credible AA investigations into the sexual violence allegations covered by its briefing. The AA's reported punishment of two soldiers in 2022 shows that at least one disciplinary action had previously been publicly announced. But there is insufficient public information to assess whether meaningful accountability measures were taken in response to the more recent allegations.^[85]

Sexual violence as evidence of crimes against humanity

The reported sexual violence must be considered alongside the wider treatment of Rohingya civilians.

Under Article 7 of the Rome Statute, rape and other forms of sexual violence can constitute crimes against humanity when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, with the required knowledge and other legal elements. Sexual violence may also contribute to persecution when victims are deliberately targeted because of their ethnic, religious, or other protected identity.^[86]

The allegations documented by BROUK, together with UN findings, raise serious concerns indicating that sexual violence against Rohingya women and girls was connected to broader practices of detention, forced recruitment, intimidation, and discriminatory control.

The strongest concern is not simply that several sexual assaults were reported. It is that some of the assaults occurred in settings where AA personnel exercised direct authority over victims, including detention facilities, recruitment operations, and civilian homes, which support findings of crimes against humanity, including rape, torture, persecution, and other inhumane acts.

The allegations against AA personnel require investigators to examine whether Rohingya women were targeted because of their ethnic identity, whether sexual violence was used to terrorize or destroy family and community life, and whether the acts formed part of a wider effort to physically destroy the Rohingya population.

At present, the public evidence supports that the Arakan Army members commit sexual violence as a possible war crime and crime against humanity.

The central concern is that Rohingya women and girls have reportedly faced sexual violence both during the AA's operations and after it established control over their communities. The allegations describe abuse during flight, detention, recruitment, and ordinary civilian life. This pattern shows that the danger has extended well beyond active fighting.

4.6. Forced Recruitment and the Use of Children

The forced recruitment of Rohingya civilians has become another serious concern in areas controlled by the Arakan Army (AA). Reports from 2024 to 2026 describe Rohingya men and boys being pressured to join AA forces, families being threatened when they refused, and village administrators being ordered to provide recruits. More recent accounts suggest that women and girls have also faced recruitment demands.

The allegations are particularly troubling because the Rohingya have already experienced forced recruitment by the Myanmar military. During the fighting in 2024, the military recruited Rohingya men, including some who had been detained or coerced, and used them in operations against the AA. Some Rohingya armed groups also allegedly cooperated with the military. These developments placed Rohingya civilians at risk of being viewed as enemies by whichever armed force controlled their area.^[87]

The conduct of the Myanmar military and Rohingya armed groups needs to be examined separately from that of the AA. Their abuses do not excuse forced recruitment by AA personnel. Nor does the presence of Rohingya fighters in opposing armed groups justify treating Rohingya civilians as potential combatants.

The evidence concerning AA recruitment is important because it describes a possible system of coercion carried out through local administrative structures, rather than only the actions of individual fighters.

Recruitment demands following the AA's territorial expansion

As the AA gained control of Buthidaung and Maungdaw in 2024, Rohingya residents reported growing pressure to provide men for military-related activities.

In July 2025, Human Rights Watch documented reports that AA members were recruiting Rohingya men and boys, including through threats and pressure on village leaders. Residents described being ordered to provide recruits and fearing punishment if their communities failed to meet the demands.^[88]

The organization reported that Rohingya faced severe restrictions on movement, detention, and forced labor alongside recruitment demands. These practices are relevant because they limit residents' ability to refuse or escape recruitment.

Fortify Rights also documented allegations of coercive recruitment in northern Rakhine. Its October 2025 investigation described the Arakan Army demanding recruits from Rohingya villages and using local administrators to identify people who could be taken for military service.^[89]

The role of village administrators is significant. Recruitment carried out through a local administrative system indicates that demands were organized and communicated through an established chain of authority.

The repeated demands across several villages indicates that the practice was known to, authorized by, or tolerated within the Arakan Army (AA/ULA).

Village quotas and threats against families

One of the most concerning features of the reported recruitment system is the use of village-level quotas.

Witnesses interviewed by Fortify Rights described AA personnel requiring Rohingya administrators to provide a specified number of recruits. Administrators were reportedly pressured to identify residents and ensure that they complied.

Some families described threats when they refused to surrender relatives for recruitment. Others reported that people were detained or beaten after resisting AA demands.^[90]

The use of quotas can create pressure on entire communities. A village administrator may be forced to choose between handing over residents and facing punishment. Families may have little ability to challenge recruitment decisions, particularly where AA personnel control movement and local security.

This form of coercion also makes it difficult to distinguish genuine voluntary enlistment from recruitment carried out under threat.

A person who agrees to join an armed group because their family has been threatened, their village faces punishment, or they have no safe means of refusal cannot necessarily be described as a willing recruit.

The legal significance depends on the circumstances, including the person's age, the methods used, the nature of the conflict, and whether the person was compelled to take part in hostilities.

Allegations involving children

The recruitment of Rohingya children requires particular attention.

Human Rights Watch reported in July 2025 that the Arakan Army had recruited Rohingya boys, including children, through coercive practices. The organization called on the AA to end forced recruitment and the recruitment or use of children.^[91]

International humanitarian law provides special protection to children during armed conflict. Recruiting or using children under the age of 15 to participate actively in hostilities is a war crime under the Rome Statute in a non-international armed conflict. International standards also prohibit compulsory recruitment of people under 18 by armed forces and call on non-state armed groups not to recruit or use anyone under 18 in hostilities.^[92]

Recruitment of Rohingya women and girls

Reports published in 2026 suggest that recruitment demands of the Arakan Army have expanded beyond men and boys.

In May 2026, the Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK (BROUK) reported that AA personnel had detained Rohingya women and girls during recruitment operations. Its investigation described women being taken from villages, held in AA facilities, and exposed to threats of physical and sexual violence.^[93]

But detention during a recruitment operation does not by itself establish that every detained woman or girl was subsequently enrolled in an armed unit. However, the finding illustrates how the threat of recruitment can affect an entire community, even when the number of people actually recruited remains uncertain.

Parents who fear that their daughters may be taken away may make decisions they would otherwise reject. Children may leave school, families may move, and girls may be married before adulthood because relatives believe marriage will reduce their exposure to armed personnel.

These consequences should not be overlooked simply because they are less visible than arrests or physical violence.

Continued recruitment allegations in October 2026

Reports from Rohingya community media suggest that recruitment pressure continued. On 15 October 2026, Muslim Network TV published an account attributed to Rohingya Khobor concerning an AA meeting reportedly held on 12 October in northern Maungdaw. The report says AA authorities demanded money, labor, and young recruits from Rohingya communities. The account also described threats of relocation if residents failed to comply.^[94]

This report is relevant because it describes recruitment alongside financial and labor demands. Such a combination indicates that Rohingya communities were being required to provide several forms of support to the AA under threat of punishment.

But the reporting appears to rely on a single underlying Rohingya Khobor account. Its republication does not provide independent confirmation. The alleged meeting, the officials involved, and the exact demands require further verification.

The report nevertheless suggests that recruitment should not be examined only as a practice associated with the AA's initial military offensive. Allegations continued after the organization had established administrative control over much of northern Rakhine.

The responsibility of AA 

The reported recruitment practices raise questions about responsibility at different levels of the organization.

Where armed personnel seize civilians, threaten families, or compel children to join military units, their direct conduct must be investigated. Where village administrators receive recruitment quotas, investigators must also determine who issued those orders and how they were enforced.

Evidence of repeated quotas across several villages could help establish whether recruitment was organized through the AA's administrative structure. Records of meetings, written instructions, witness testimony, recruitment lists, and information from former AA personnel would be particularly valuable.

The AA's response must also be examined. An organization that exercises control over territory and maintains a chain of command has the ability to issue instructions to its personnel, investigate allegations, and discipline those responsible for abuses.

The public evidence does not establish the full chain of command behind the reported recruitment operations. It does, but indicates senior officials knew about coercive recruitment.

Legal significance: Forced recruitment and crimes against humanity

Forced recruitment can involve several different violations of international law. Its legal classification depends on the age of the person recruited, the methods used, the duties imposed, and the circumstances of the armed conflict.

Recruiting or using children under 15 in hostilities can constitute a war crime. Compelling civilians to perform military-related work may also violate international humanitarian law. Where recruitment involves unlawful imprisonment, severe abuse, persecution, or other prohibited acts, those acts may contribute to crimes against humanity.

The reports against AA personnel are particularly concerning because recruitment reportedly occurred alongside movement restrictions, arbitrary detention, threats, and forced labor.

Because Rohingya residents were selected for coercive recruitment based on their ethnic identity, and as the evidence indicates that these practices formed part of a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population, they provide evidence relevant to the crime against humanity of persecution.

The involvement of children adds another dimension. Removing children from their families and exposing them to military training or combat can cause serious physical and psychological harm.

The more immediate conclusion is that the reported recruitment practices raise serious concerns about coercion, discrimination, and protecting children under AA control.

Taken together, the allegations describe Rohingya communities facing demands for recruits while also living under restrictions that limit their ability to refuse. The reported involvement of village administrators, repeated recruitment quotas, and threats against families suggest that these practices have extended beyond isolated incidents.

The reported recruitment of Rohingya civilians cannot be assessed separately from the detention, forced labor, displacement, and other abuses documented in AA-controlled areas.

4.7. Forced Labor and Exploitation

Forced labor has emerged as one of the most frequently reported abuses against Rohingya civilians living under Arakan Army (AA) control. Since the AA expanded its control across northern Rakhine State in 2024, residents have described being compelled to work on roads, military positions, administrative facilities, and construction projects without adequate payment or the freedom to refuse. Some reported being taken away for days or weeks, while others had to provide labor according to quotas imposed on their villages.

The allegations are particularly serious because they concern civilians who are already facing severe restrictions on movement, employment, and access to food. For families dependent on daily wages or subsistence farming, compulsory labor can mean losing the time needed to earn an income, cultivate land, or obtain basic necessities.

The evidence suggests that forced labor has not been confined to occasional demands made by individual soldiers. Reports describe labor requirements communicated through local administrators, repeated across villages, and enforced through threats of detention, physical punishment, or financial penalties.^[95]

These practices raise questions about whether the AA has used Rohingya civilian labor to support its military operations and territorial administration, and whether such exploitation forms part of a broader system of discriminatory control.

Forced labor during the AA's military expansion

Reports of forced labor began to increase as the AA captured territory in Buthidaung and Maungdaw townships during 2024.

Rohingya residents described being ordered to carry supplies, transport materials, dig trenches, and perform other work for AA personnel. Some of these activities were directly connected to military operations, while others involved construction and maintenance in areas under AA control.

Fortify Rights documented allegations that AA forces compelled Rohingya civilians to work without their consent. Its July 2025 investigation included testimony from survivors who described being forced to carry military supplies and perform other physically demanding tasks.^[96]

The distinction between voluntary employment and forced labor is essential. Civilians may lawfully work for an authority or armed organization under certain circumstances. But work performed because of threats, detention, or fear of punishment cannot reasonably be described as voluntary.

Compelling civilians to support military operations also raises separate concerns under international humanitarian law, particularly where the work exposes them to danger or directly assists combat activities.

Village quotas and organized labor demands

The October 2025 investigation by Fortify Rights provides some of the clearest evidence of how compulsory labor was reportedly organized.

The organization interviewed Rohingya residents who described AA authorities imposing labor quotas on villages in northern Rakhine. Local administrators were allegedly required to identify workers and ensure that a specified number of people reported for assigned tasks. Residents who refused faced threats, detention, or demands for payment.^[97]

The reported use of village quotas is important because it suggests that labor demands were organized through the AA's administrative structure.

A quota system can make an entire community responsible for supplying workers. Families may be pressured to send members even when they are sick, elderly, or needed at home. Village administrators may also face punishment if they fail to meet the demands.

This arrangement can create coercion even when armed personnel do not personally threaten every worker. If residents understand that refusal will lead to arrest, fines, or retaliation, their participation may not be genuinely voluntary.

The evidence therefore requires investigation into who established the quotas, how they were communicated, and whether AA commanders or administrative officials supervised their enforcement.

Construction of military positions and infrastructure

Several investigations describe Rohingya civilians being compelled to construct or maintain facilities used by the AA.

Human Rights Watch reported in July 2025 that Rohingya residents had been forced to work on roads, military installations, and other projects. Some witnesses described being taken from their villages and required to perform physically demanding labor without payment.^[98]

The October 2026 investigation by The Guardian provided further evidence of compulsory labor connected to the destruction and repurposing of Rohingya land.

Residents described being ordered to dismantle buildings, clear land, and construct facilities for AA use. Some said they were forced to work on roads and trenches while being denied access to their own farmland. Satellite imagery showed new infrastructure in areas where Rohingya homes and agricultural land had previously existed.^[99]

The combination of land confiscation and forced labor is particularly concerning. Residents may lose their property and then be compelled to work on projects that prevent them from recovering it.

If corroborated, such practices would show that exploitation was connected not only to military needs but also to the transformation of civilian areas under AA control.

The witness accounts provide specific allegations that can be tested against the location, timing, and purpose of construction projects.

Forced labor in detention and displacement camps

Reports also describe compulsory labor involving Rohingya detainees and displaced civilians.

Human Rights Watch's May 2026 investigation into the Hoyyar Siri massacre documented allegations that survivors relocated to Hnget Thay camp were forced to work for AA authorities. Residents described restrictions on movement and inadequate access to food and medical care.^[100]

These conditions raise concerns because displaced people may have little practical ability to refuse labor demands. When residents depend on an armed authority for permission to move, obtain food, or remain in a camp, the threat of punishment may be implicit even without an explicit order.

Kaladan Press Network also reported allegations of forced labor involving Rohingya returnees detained in Maungdaw in 2025. Former detainees described being required to work while held in AA facilities, alongside beatings, inadequate food, and demands for money.^[101]

The Kaladan Press investigation acknowledged that it could not independently verify all the allegations. Still, the accounts are relevant because they describe forced labor occurring in a custodial setting where detainees had limited freedom and were allegedly subjected to other forms of abuse.

The legal assessment of labor performed by detainees depends on the circumstances. But work imposed through violence, intimidation, or unlawful detention raises serious concerns, especially when it serves military purposes or benefits the detaining armed group.

A documented case from Hpon Nyo Leik, May 2024

Fortify Rights recorded a particularly detailed account from a 23-year-old Rohingya man in Hpon Nyo Leik village, Buthidaung Township.

According to the witness, AA fighters gathered hundreds of Rohingya men inside the village mosque in May 2024. Armed personnel surrounded them and accused them of having supported the Myanmar military before the AA captured Buthidaung. The men were then ordered to work for the AA.^[102]

The witness reported that he was forced to construct a detention facility for approximately one month before workers from another village replaced his group.^[103]

This testimony is significant for two reasons. First, the labor was reportedly demanded at gunpoint, leaving little question about whether the witness considered participation voluntary. Second, the alleged justification was collective responsibility: the men were told they had supported the military, rather than being individually accused of specific conduct.

If corroborated, the incident demonstrates how allegations of past political or military affiliation were used to compel civilian labor.

The experience of a Rohingya village administrator in Nga Yant Chaung

Fortify Rights also interviewed a 30-year-old Rohingya administrator appointed by the AA in Nga Yant Chaung village, Buthidaung Township.

The administrator estimated that more than 1,000 men under his authority had reported for compulsory labor at AA demand. He said AA soldiers beat him when he failed to provide the required number of workers. On one occasion, he reported receiving 20 strokes as punishment.

He acknowledged that he subsequently threatened villagers himself because he feared being beaten again.^[104]

This account offers insight into how coercion may have operated through local administration. The AA allegedly imposed quotas on the administrator, punished him when he failed, and thereby pressured him to coerce other Rohingya residents.

A village administrator who threatens residents may participate in an abusive system while also being subjected to threats and violence himself. His actions and the coercion he faced must be examined separately.

The reported scale of the labor demands is relevant to determining that the forced labor was systematic.

Financial penalties and restrictions used to compel work

Forced labor was reportedly enforced through economic pressure as well as physical threats.

A 23-year-old Rohingya man told Fortify Rights that residents who refused compulsory labor had to pay 50,000 kyat for each day of absence. Another witness said he paid more than one million kyat to avoid working but eventually feared detention if he continued refusing.^[105]

These accounts demonstrate why the presence of a payment alternative does not necessarily make labor voluntary. If the financial penalty is unaffordable and refusal exposes a person to detention or violence, the individual may have no realistic freedom to decline.

Fortify Rights reported that none of the forced laborers in the cases it documented received compensation. It also recorded allegations that restrictions on travel, business, and access to food were used to pressure residents into complying.

This combination of financial penalties, movement restrictions, and threats suggests that compulsory labor was connected to the wider administrative controls imposed on Rohingya communities.

Dangerous labor near military positions

Some of the most serious allegations involve civilians being forced to work near active combat.

Fortify Rights interviewed a 45-year-old Rohingya man who said AA personnel compelled him and other detainees to dig trenches near hills and mountains. According to his account, Myanmar military artillery struck nearby areas while they were working.

Another witness, a 28-year-old Rohingya man who reported being forcibly recruited for approximately one year, described being trained to use firearms and then required to carry ammunition, transport supplies, and perform construction work.^[106]

These allegations raise concerns beyond economic exploitation. Civilians compelled to work near military positions may be exposed to artillery, airstrikes, and other dangers associated with combat.

The reported use of civilians to transport military supplies through dangerous areas also requires investigation into whether they were deliberately placed at risk to protect AA personnel or equipment.

Compelling civilians to perform dangerous military-related work may independently violate international humanitarian law.

Forced labor affecting other ethnic communities

Although this paper focuses on Rohingya civilians, the evidence shows that the AA's reported labor practices have affected other ethnic minorities.

Fortify Rights documented allegations involving Hindu, Mro, and Chakma residents. One Hindu boat operator said he had to transport AA troops and supplies each week without a genuine opportunity to refuse. Another witness described Rohingya and Mro workers being forced to demolish buildings before Hindu residents were ordered to transport construction materials.

The organization also recorded some allegations involving ethnic Rakhine civilians, particularly people previously associated with the Myanmar military. But it found that the broader Rakhine civilian population did not appear to face forced labor on the same scale.^[107]

This distinction matters for the legal analysis. That multiple ethnic groups experienced compulsory labor does not eliminate the possibility of persecution against Rohingya. It must be examined whether Rohingya were disproportionately targeted, subjected to harsher conditions, or selected because of their identity.

The AA's response to forced labor allegations

The AA has denied allegations that it systematically exploits Rohingya civilians through forced labor.

In September 2025, the organization rejected accusations of compulsory labor and described the allegations as attempts to damage its reputation. It also maintained that detainees were not required to perform hard labor beyond routine physical exercise.^[108]

Fortify Rights reported that the AA did not respond to its request for comment on the specific allegations published in October 2025.

The accounts documented by Fortify Rights identify particular villages, dates, types of work, financial penalties, and methods of coercion. They can therefore be investigated through additional interviews, administrative records, and evidence from former AA personnel.

Legal significance: Forced labor and persecution

Forced labor is prohibited under international law when work is demanded under threat of punishment and the person has not freely offered to perform it. The International Labour Organization's Forced Labour Convention provides the established definition. International humanitarian law also protects civilians and detainees against abusive and dangerous labor practices.^[109]

The allegations against AA personnel describe several features associated with forced labor: armed threats, punishment for refusal, compulsory quotas, non-payment, restrictions on movement, and the use of civilians for military-related work.

These practices may amount to violations of international humanitarian law and, depending on the specific conduct, war crimes. Where forced labor is accompanied by unlawful detention, torture, persecution, or other serious abuses, those acts may also contribute to crimes against humanity if committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilians.

The reported involvement of village administrators and repeated labor quotas is especially important for assessing whether the conduct was organized. Evidence that the same methods were used across several locations establish a broader pattern of abuse.

Forced labor may also be relevant to the crime against humanity of persecution if Rohingya civilians were deliberately subjected to severe deprivation of rights because of their ethnic or religious identity.

The most significant feature of the evidence is the reported use of administrative authority to compel civilian work. The accounts describe labor demands enforced through village leaders, financial penalties, detention, and threats of violence. These practices indicate that forced labor was not merely an occasional consequence of military operations but a recurring method of control over communities living under AA control.

4.8. Land Confiscation, Destruction of Property, and Demographic Changes

The reported confiscation of Rohingya land under Arakan Army (AA) control raises questions that extend beyond the immediate destruction caused by fighting. Since 2024, Rohingya residents in northern Rakhine State have described losing access to their homes, farmland, orchards, and village land. In some locations, land previously occupied by Rohingya communities has reportedly been cleared and repurposed for military installations, displacement camps, administrative facilities, or settlements intended for other populations.

These developments are important because land is central to the Rohingya's ability to remain in Rakhine State. For many families, agricultural land provides their principal source of food and income. Losing it can make survival difficult even when residents are not formally ordered to leave.

The evidence also raises a longer-term concern. If Rohingya villages are demolished and their land is reassigned, displacement may become permanent. Families who eventually obtain permission to return may discover that their homes no longer exist or that other people have been settled on their property.

Investigations published in 2025 and 2026 provide substantial indication that land confiscation has become part of a wider system of exclusion affecting Rohingya communities.^[110]

The disappearance of Rohingya settlements after 2024

An investigation by The Guardian, published on 1 October 2026, combined satellite imagery, verified video footage, survivor interviews, and information from an internal United Nations report. The UN research identified at least 800 hectares of land across 23 Rohingya villages that had been seized and repurposed since 2024. The affected land was reportedly used for displacement camps, settlements for other communities, or military infrastructure.^[111]

The investigation documented destroying villages in Buthidaung Township, including Ywet Nyo Taung and U Hla Hpay. Residents described houses being demolished, trees and orchards removed, and agricultural fields confiscated. Some said they were forced to dismantle Rohingya buildings and use the materials to construct Arakan Army facilities.

One resident, Mohammed Sadik, described how the Arakan Army prohibited families from farming their own land and compelled residents to perform heavy labor, including road construction and trench digging. The investigation also identified the construction of military facilities in areas where Rohingya homes had previously stood.^[112]

But an important limitation remains. The head of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, Nicholas Koumjian, told The Guardian that the Mechanism had not confirmed AA responsibility for all the reported destruction of Rohingya land. This does not negate the documented changes in land use, but it means that responsibility must be established separately for each location.^[113]

Legal significance: Property deprivation and persecution

The reported confiscation and destruction of Rohingya property may be relevant to several international crimes.

Under international humanitarian law, the destruction or seizure of an adversary's property is prohibited unless imperatively demanded by the necessities of war, subject to the applicable rules. Pillage is also prohibited. Whether particular acts constitute war crimes depends on the circumstances, including the status of the property, the nature of the conflict, and the conduct and intent of those responsible.^[114]

Property deprivation may also contribute to the crime against humanity of persecution when it involves an intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights because of a group's identity and is connected to the other required elements of that crime.

The claims about Rohingya land are particularly relevant in this respect because they describe more than isolated losses of property. Some reports indicate that residents were prevented from returning, denied access to farmland, compelled to dismantle buildings, and required to work on facilities constructed on land they had previously occupied.

The strongest conclusion supported by the evidence is that Rohingya property rights face serious threats in areas under AA control. Investigations have documented substantial changes to former Rohingya settlements, while witnesses have alleged confiscation, demolition, forced labor, and restrictions on return.

The significance of these developments lies in their cumulative effect. Violence may force families to flee, but the loss of land and destruction of homes can prevent them from rebuilding their lives. If the reported changes become permanent, they may fundamentally alter the prospects for Rohingya return to northern Rakhine.

4.9. Discriminatory Governance and Collective Punishment

The Arakan Army's (AA) treatment of Rohingya civilians cannot be assessed solely through incidents of violence during military operations. Since gaining control over most of northern Rakhine State in 2024, the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA) has assumed increasing responsibility for local administration, security, movement, and the regulation of civilian life. Its decisions now affect whether Rohingya residents can travel, work, cultivate land, obtain medical treatment, or return to their villages.

This transition from armed opposition to territorial authority is significant. During active fighting, civilian suffering may result from the actions of several parties. Once an armed organization establishes effective control over an area, but restrictions imposed through its own administrative institutions become more directly attributable to that organization.

Human Rights Watch, OHCHR, and other investigators have documented allegations that Rohingya communities under AA control face restrictions and demands that interfere with ordinary civilian life. These include movement permits, curfews, forced labor, arbitrary detention, financial exactions, and limitations on access to farmland and other livelihoods.^[115]

The main issue is whether these measures represent lawful and proportionate security administration or a system that disproportionately burdens Rohingya civilians because of their ethnic and religious identity.

Restrictions on movement and everyday life

Movement restrictions are among the most consistently documented complaints from Rohingya residents under AA control.

Human Rights Watch reported in July 2025 that Rohingya civilians faced curfews and permit requirements for travel between villages. Residents described having to obtain authorization from local administrators and AA authorities before leaving their communities. Some reported paying between 3,000 and 5,000 kyat for permits valid for a single day.^[116]

The restrictions affected ordinary activities, including farming, fishing, visiting relatives, seeking employment, and obtaining medical treatment.

One Rohingya resident described how people feared being arrested if they traveled without permission or remained outside their homes after curfew. Others reported that families could not safely access farmland or markets.

Restrictions on movement may be justified in certain circumstances, particularly where fighting continues or landmines and unexploded ordnance threaten civilians. But their legality and legitimacy depend on their purpose, duration, proportionality, and application.

The evidence raises concerns because the reported restrictions were accompanied by allegations of arbitrary detention, financial penalties, and interference with access to food and livelihoods.

When a community requires permission for routine travel and faces punishment for noncompliance, movement controls can become a means of regulating nearly every aspect of civilian life.

The question is whether Rohingya residents faced restrictions that were more severe, more prolonged, or more arbitrarily enforced than those affecting other communities.

Discrimination in access to livelihoods and essential services

Restrictions on farming, fishing, and employment have had serious consequences for Rohingya households.

Human Rights Watch documented reports of families struggling to obtain food because they could not freely work or travel. Residents described dependence on assistance from neighbors and difficulty securing income.^[117]

OHCHR similarly reported that Rohingya civilians under AA control faced restrictions affecting their livelihoods and access to essential services. These conditions contributed to worsening food insecurity and vulnerability, particularly among displaced families.^[118]

The effects were intensified by the wider humanitarian crisis in Rakhine State. Myanmar military restrictions, continuing insecurity, disrupted markets, and barriers to humanitarian assistance affected communities across the state.

These broader conditions must not be attributed entirely to the AA. But restrictions imposed directly by AA authorities require separate examination, especially where they prevent Rohingya civilians from meeting basic needs.

The distinction is important for determining responsibility. A food shortage caused by general conflict conditions is not equivalent to a deliberate policy of depriving a particular population of food. Investigators must establish whether AA personnel intentionally imposed restrictions, whether they knew the consequences, and whether those measures were discriminatory or otherwise unlawful.

Financial exactions and collective penalties

Reports also describe demands for money imposed on Rohingya residents and communities.

Some witnesses interviewed by human rights organizations said they had to pay fees for movement permits or to avoid compulsory labor. Others alleged that families were asked to pay money to secure the release of detained relatives.

Fortify Rights documented accounts of financial penalties imposed when villagers failed to meet labor requirements. In one case, a resident reported being required to pay 50,000 kyat for each day he refused compulsory work.^[119]

These demands raise concerns about coercive taxation and extortion.

An authority exercising territorial control may collect revenue for public administration under certain circumstances. But financial demands enforced through threats, arbitrary detention, or physical violence are fundamentally different from transparent and lawful taxation.

The reported use of penalties against villages or families also raises questions about collective punishment.

Under international humanitarian law, civilians must not be punished for offenses they have not personally committed. If an entire village is penalized because some residents refused recruitment, failed to provide workers, or were suspected of supporting an opposing armed group, such measures may violate the prohibition on collective punishment.

The evidence does not show that every reported financial demand was a collective penalty. Investigators must examine the reason for each demand, who imposed it, and whether residents were being punished for the conduct of others.

Still, the reported combination of village quotas, financial penalties, and threats against administrators provides grounds to investigate whether collective pressure was used as a method of governance.

Religious identity, community institutions, and unequal treatment

The Rohingya's position as a predominantly Muslim minority makes religious freedom an important part of assessing the AA's administration. Myanmar's previous governments subjected Rohingya communities to extensive restrictions on citizenship, movement, education, and religious life. The AA inherited territory where these discriminatory structures had operated for decades.

The question is whether the ULA/AA has dismantled those restrictions or reproduced them through its own institutions.

The available reporting documents serious interference with Rohingya civilian life, including restrictions on travel and allegations of damage to mosques and other community property. OHCHR has also reported that some displaced Rohingya returning to their villages found religious buildings destroyed.^[120]

But destroying a mosque during fighting does not, by itself, establish that the building was deliberately targeted because of its religious significance. Nor does the evidence justify concluding that the AA has imposed a uniform ban on Muslim worship throughout its territory.

A credible investigation must distinguish between damage caused by hostilities, deliberate attacks on religious property, and administrative restrictions on religious practice.

How the Arakan Army treated mosques, religious leaders, schools, and community organizations remains relevant because these institutions help sustain Rohingya communal life. Evidence that AA deliberately restricted or destroyed them because of their religious identity could support a finding of persecution.

The role of Rohingya village administrators

The ULA/AA's use of Rohingya village administrators is an important feature of its governing system.

Local administrators reportedly communicate orders, organize labor quotas, identify residents for recruitment, and help enforce movement restrictions. sometimes, they also serve as intermediaries between Rohingya communities and AA personnel.

Their involvement can make the administration appear locally representative. But testimony collected by Fortify Rights suggests that some administrators operate under significant coercion.

As discussed in Section 4.7, an administrator from Nga Yant Chaung described being beaten when he failed to provide the required number of laborers. He subsequently pressured residents because he feared further punishment.^[121]

This account illustrates how an armed organization can enforce demands through local intermediaries without directly confronting every household.

It also raises questions about how far Rohingya communities participate meaningfully in decisions affecting them. Appointing Rohingya administrators does not necessarily provide residents with genuine political representation if those administrators cannot refuse orders or protect community members from abuse.

Also, their presence should not be dismissed as inherently illegitimate. Some may help residents obtain services, resolve disputes, or communicate security concerns. Their roles and degree of independence may vary.

The relevant question is whether the administrative system provides meaningful protection and accountability or primarily functions to transmit coercive demands.

The AA's public commitments and the gap between policy and practice

The ULA/AA has repeatedly rejected accusations of systematic abuse and has publicly emphasized its intention to govern different communities in Rakhine State.

In interviews with The New Humanitarian in May 2024, AA representatives disputed claims about attacks on Rohingya civilians and presented their military operations as directed against the Myanmar military rather than the Rohingya population.^[122]

The organization has also denied allegations of forced labor and maintained that its administration seeks to maintain security and order.

These statements must be included in any balanced assessment. They may reflect official policies that prohibit certain abuses, disagreements over factual responsibility, or an effort to defend the organization's reputation.

But public commitments do not establish how an administration operates in practice.

The relevant evidence includes whether restrictions are applied consistently, whether complaints can be made safely, whether allegations are independently investigated, and whether perpetrators are disciplined.

Where credible allegations repeatedly arise from different locations, the absence of transparent investigations becomes increasingly important.

Conversely, evidence of genuine disciplinary action, the removal of unlawful restrictions, or meaningful protection of Rohingya rights would be relevant to assessing the organization's conduct and responsibility.

The available public record does not permit a comprehensive assessment of all ULA/AA administrative institutions. It does, but reveal a substantial gap between the organization's stated commitment to inclusive governance and the serious abuses reported by Rohingya residents and independent investigators.

Collective punishment and the presumption of Rohingya disloyalty

A recurring feature of the allegations is how authorities treated Rohingya civilians as collectively responsible for the actions of armed groups or the Myanmar military.

During the 2024 conflict, the Myanmar military forcibly recruited Rohingya men and collaborated with certain Rohingya armed organizations. These developments intensified tensions between the AA and Rohingya communities.

But responsibility for participation in hostilities needs to be assessed individually. The actions of ARSA, RSO, or Rohingya recruits serving with the Myanmar military cannot lawfully justify punishing unrelated civilians.

The testimony from Hpon Nyo Leik, where Rohingya men were reportedly gathered and compelled to work after being accused collectively of supporting the military, illustrates the danger.^[123]

Similar concerns arise where villages are threatened because they fail to provide recruits or laborers, or where residents are detained without individualized evidence of wrongdoing.

The prohibition of collective punishment is particularly relevant because the AA exercises authority over communities that may have little influence over armed actors operating in their name.

If civilians were punished because they were Rohingya or because authorities presumed collective loyalty to an opposing force, such conduct could contribute to evidence of persecution.

Overall assessment of the documented patterns

The evidence examined in Section IV describes several categories of alleged abuse: killings, destruction of villages, displacement, detention, sexual violence, coercive recruitment, forced labor, confiscation of property, and discriminatory restrictions.

These categories should not be treated as automatically proving a single organizational policy.

Still, several features warrant examination across the evidence.

First, allegations have continued after the AA established territorial control. This is relevant because abuses occurring under an established administration cannot always be explained as consequences of active fighting.

Second, some reported practices involve local administrators, quotas, detention facilities, and recurring financial demands. These features may indicate organizational involvement rather than spontaneous misconduct.

Third, the alleged violations affect several fundamental aspects of Rohingya civilian life: physical safety, freedom, housing, land, livelihoods, and the ability to remain in or return to their communities.

Fourth, reports from different organizations describe overlapping methods of control, although they do not always independently corroborate the same incidents.

These findings provide a strong indication that the Arakan Army’s conduct constitutes a widespread or systematic attack against Rohingya civilians.

The evidence supports serious indication as crimes against humanity against Rohingya is committed by the Arakan Army, particularly persecution, forcible transfer, imprisonment, torture, and other prohibited acts.

V. Application of International Criminal Law

Section III documents acts attributable to AA personnel that, considered together with the contextual evidence below, this report concludes constitute crimes against humanity against Rohingya civilians. This is a legal assessment of the documented conduct, not a judicial determination of any individual’s guilt.

Crimes against humanity are not defined simply by the seriousness of an individual offense or the number of victims. They concern prohibited acts committed as part of a broader attack against a civilian population. A killing, rape, unlawful detention, or forced displacement may constitute a serious crime on its own. It becomes a crime against humanity when the additional requirements of international criminal law are established.

Article 7 of the Rome Statute provides the principal framework for this assessment. It identifies specific prohibited acts and requires that they be committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population, with knowledge of that attack. The Statute also requires a course of conduct involving multiple prohibited acts, carried out pursuant to or in furtherance of a state or organizational policy.^[124]

The AA's status as a non-state armed organization does not exclude the possibility of crimes against humanity. The relevant question is whether the organization had the capacity to carry out or promote an attack against civilians and whether the evidence establishes the required connection between its conduct and the alleged crimes.

The record includes strongly corroborated deliberate killings and evidence of coercive displacement, severe detention, torture, and persecution, together with reported sexual violence and other abuses. Each underlying offense and the Article 7 contextual elements are assessed separately below.

5.1. Was There an Attack Directed Against a Civilian Population?

Under Article 7, an attack does not necessarily mean a military assault. It refers to a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts listed in the Statute against a civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a state or organizational policy.^[125]

The difference matters in the Rohingya context. Some allegations concern direct violence during the AA's military offensive in 2024. Others involve restrictions, detention, forced labor, and property deprivation imposed after the organization gained control of territory.

The relevant inquiry is whether these acts were connected through a broader course of conduct directed against Rohingya civilians.

The civilian character of the affected population

The evidence overwhelmingly concerns people living in villages, fleeing fighting, seeking shelter, or attempting to continue ordinary civilian life.

The victims documented in the Hoyyar Siri investigation included women, children, and elderly residents. Other documented allegations concern men taken from their homes, families detained after returning from Bangladesh, women subjected to sexual violence, and residents compelled to perform labor.

The presence of some Rohingya fighters in ARSA, RSO, or Myanmar military units does not alter the civilian character of the wider Rohingya population. International humanitarian law requires distinction between civilians and members of armed forces or organized armed groups. Civilians do not lose their protection merely because they share an ethnic or religious identity with combatants.

Even if individual civilians directly participated in hostilities, their conduct would need to be assessed individually. It would not justify attacks or collective punishment against unrelated residents.

Evidence of multiple prohibited acts

The allegations described in Section IV include conduct corresponding to several categories listed in Article 7: murder, imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty, torture, rape and other sexual violence, persecution, enforced disappearance, deportation or forcible transfer, and potentially other inhumane acts.

The evidence is strongest for particular incidents rather than for every alleged violation.

Human Rights Watch's investigation into Hoyyar Siri provides substantial evidence of direct attacks against civilians. Fortify Rights documented specific allegations of abductions, killings, torture, and compulsory labor. OHCHR and other investigators described restrictions on movement, displacement, and abuses under AA administration.^[126]

The repeated acts, their distribution across locations, and their continuation under AA administration support the conclusion that the documented offenses formed a connected course of conduct rather than unrelated incidents.

Was the attack directed against Rohingya civilians?

The phrase directed against requires examining whether the civilian population was the primary object of the course of conduct, rather than merely suffering incidental harm during attacks on legitimate military objectives.

Several reported incidents raise serious concerns on this point.

At Hoyyar Siri, witnesses described AA fighters shooting people who were visibly civilians. In other cases, Rohingya men were allegedly taken from their homes and later found dead. After territorial capture, residents reported restrictions and coercive demands affecting entire villages.

These allegations differ from ordinary battlefield casualties because they concern people who were not necessarily participating in hostilities and, sometimes, were already under AA control.

The evidence therefore supports that Rohingya civilians were deliberately targeted.

Still, the conflict's complexity must be acknowledged. The Myanmar military conducted attacks that killed Rohingya civilians, while Rohingya armed groups participated in the conflict as well.

Conduct reliably attributed to AA personnel support findings concerning an AA-directed attack.

5.2. Was the Alleged Attack Widespread or Systematic?

Article 7 requires an attack to be widespread or systematic. Both characteristics do not have to be established.^[127]

A widespread attack generally concerns the scale of violence, the number of victims, or its geographical reach. A systematic attack involves an organized or recurring pattern of conduct rather than random, unrelated acts.

The distinction is important because the allegations against the AA differ in their scale and organization. The reported killings during the 2024 offensive were concentrated in particular locations, while administrative restrictions and coercive labor demands have been documented across multiple communities and over a longer period.

Evidence relevant to a widespread attack

The Hoyyar Siri massacre provides the clearest evidence of a potentially large-scale attack against Rohingya civilians. Other allegations concern killings in Maungdaw, attacks on civilians fleeing toward Bangladesh, and serious abuses in villages across Buthidaung and Maungdaw townships.

The geographical distribution and number of affected communities are relevant to determining that the alleged attack was widespread.

The Hoyyar Siri figure includes missing persons whose deaths have not all been individually confirmed.

Evidence relevant to a systematic attack

The evidence of a potentially systematic attack is particularly important because several reported practices appear to involve administrative coordination.

Fortify Rights documented allegations of compulsory labor quotas, recruitment demands, and punishment of village administrators who failed to comply. Human Rights Watch reported repeated restrictions on movement, detention, and livelihoods. OHCHR documented barriers to return and discriminatory treatment affecting displaced Rohingya communities.

These practices differ from spontaneous violence by individual fighters. They involve recurring demands, designated authorities, and mechanisms for enforcement.

The testimony of the Nga Yant Chaung village administrator is especially relevant. He described receiving labor quotas from AA personnel, being beaten when he failed to provide workers, and subsequently pressuring residents to comply.

These evidence demonstrate that coercive practices were implemented through a functioning administrative system.

Preliminary assessment

The evidence provides substantial grounds to investigate both the widespread and systematic character of the alleged attack.

The reported scale of killings and displacement raises the widespread question. The recurring use of village administrators, quotas, detention, and coercive restrictions raises the systematic question.

The evidence of administrative coordination is particularly significant. It helps connect abuses occurring in different locations and at different times.

5.3. Did the Alleged Attack Follow an Organizational Policy?

The organizational-policy requirement is central to assessing the AA's possible responsibility for crimes against humanity.

Article 7(2)(a) requires that the course of conduct be carried out pursuant to or in furtherance of a state or organizational policy. The ICC's Elements of Crimes explains that such a policy involves the organization actively promoting or encouraging an attack against civilians. A written order is not indispensable, and policy may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. Mere failure to prevent crimes, but is not enough by itself.^[128]

The AA's organizational capacity

The AA is not a loosely organized group operating without territorial or command structures. It has an identifiable leadership, organized military forces, and an associated political administration through the United League of Arakan.

Its ability to conduct sustained military operations, capture territory, establish local authorities, and regulate civilian activities demonstrates substantial organizational capacity.

These characteristics are relevant because an organization must have sufficient means to coordinate the alleged attack. A non-state group need not possess every institution of a recognized government to satisfy that requirement.

The AA's military and administrative development therefore provides a credible basis for examining it as an organization capable of implementing a policy within the meaning of Article 7.

But the capacity to implement a policy is not proof that a criminal policy existed.

That further conclusion depends on evidence connecting the organization to the alleged attack against Rohingya civilians.

Evidence suggesting organizational involvement

Several findings warrant examination.

First, witnesses have described repeated labor and recruitment demands communicated through local administrators rather than isolated encounters with individual soldiers.

Second, residents have reported movement restrictions and detention practices enforced by AA security personnel.

Third, some displaced communities have allegedly been prevented from returning to their villages while their land was used for other purposes.

Fourth, reports describe abuses continuing after the AA established control, when its administrative authorities had greater capacity to regulate the conduct of personnel.

These circumstances could support an inference that at least some coercive practices were organized or officially tolerated indicating organizational involvement.

The AA's denials and claims of civilian protection

The AA has rejected allegations of systematic abuses against Rohingya and has asserted that its military operations were directed against the Myanmar military and associated armed groups.

It has also stated that its personnel took measures to protect civilians and facilitate evacuations.

These responses are relevant to assessing whether the organization officially promoted prohibited conduct.

But an official denial does not settle the factual question. A policy may be inferred from conduct even when an organization publicly rejects allegations. 

Evidence of genuine preventive orders, disciplinary measures, or protection of Rohingya civilians have not been independently found so far.

5.4. Knowledge of the Attack and the Connection to Individual Acts

Crimes against humanity require a connection between the individual prohibited act and the wider attack.

The perpetrator must know that the conduct forms part of the attack or intend it to be part of the attack. The ICC's Elements of Crimes makes clear that the person need not know every characteristic of the attack or the precise details of an organizational policy.^[129]

This requirement prevents the automatic classification of every offense committed in an affected area as a crime against humanity.

An AA fighter who unlawfully assaults a civilian for a personal reason may commit a serious offense. Whether that assault is also a crime against humanity depends on its relationship to the broader attack and the perpetrator's relevant knowledge.

The same distinction applies to killings, detention, sexual violence, and forced labor.

Knowledge among direct perpetrators

The alleged conduct at Hoyyar Siri raises particularly serious questions about the knowledge of participating fighters.

Witnesses described civilians gathering, attempting to escape, and being shot despite their apparent civilian status. Those circumstances are relevant to determining that the fighters intentionally attacked civilians.

But knowledge that a victim is a civilian is not identical to knowledge of a widespread or systematic attack. The fact that they were deliberately Rohingya indicates the fighters understood their actions to be connected to a broader course of conduct.

Knowledge among administrative and security personnel

The evidence concerning forced labor, detention, and movement restrictions raises different questions.

Personnel repeatedly enforcing village quotas or detaining residents under established procedures may have greater awareness of the wider administrative system than individuals involved in an isolated incident.

For example, an officer who regularly receives workers from several villages may know that compulsory labor is being imposed across a wider area. A detention official may know that residents are repeatedly being imprisoned for the same prohibited reasons.

Such knowledge could be relevant to the contextual elements of crimes against humanity

5.5. Assessment of Specific Crimes Against Humanity

This section identifies the Article 7 underlying offenses supported by the record. Property destruction, forced recruitment, and forced labor do not automatically constitute standalone crimes against humanity; depending on the facts, they may evidence persecution, forcible transfer, imprisonment, torture, or other inhumane acts, and some conduct may separately constitute war crimes.

Murder, Article 7(1)(a)

The claims about Hoyyar Siri provide the strongest factual basis for investigating murder as a crime against humanity.

Human Rights Watch's investigation combined witness accounts, photographs, video material, and satellite imagery. It identified many people reported killed or missing and concluded that AA fighters had deliberately attacked Rohingya civilians.

Fortify Rights also documented the April 2024 killing and mutilation of five Rohingya men in Maungdaw, supported by witness testimony and video evidence.

These incidents provide substantial grounds to investigate unlawful killings by AA personnel.

Rohingya eyewitnesses attributed the August 2024 Naf River attacks to the AA, which denied involvement. Those accounts are relevant to the assessment of murder but disputed attribution prevents treating these attacks as conclusively established AA conduct.

Deportation or forcible transfer, Article 7(1)(d)

The evidence concerning displacement is substantial.

The strongest allegations include the forced relocation of Hoyyar Siri survivors, the prevention of return to rural Buthidaung villages, and the detention or removal of Rohingya returning from Bangladesh.

Forcible transfer does not require a person to be physically carried away. Threats, violence, fear of detention, or other coercive conditions may eliminate genuine choice.

The reported denial of return after the end of major fighting is particularly relevant, especially where homes or farmland were subsequently repurposed.

These findings support investigating forcible transfer and, where people were forced across an internationally recognized border, deportation, indicating criminal deportation or forcible transfer.

Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of liberty, Article 7(1)(e)

Human Rights Watch, Fortify Rights, and other sources documented allegations of Rohingya civilians being detained without clear charges or meaningful legal safeguards.

Reported cases include prolonged detention, punishment for movement violations, detention of returnees, and arrests connected to labor or recruitment demands.

Detention imposed arbitrarily and in violation of fundamental rules of international law may satisfy the underlying conduct requirement of Article 7(1)(e).

Torture, Article 7(1)(f)

Fortify Rights documented allegations of beatings and severe abuse of Rohingya detainees. Other reports describe mistreatment in detention facilities and physical punishment imposed on village administrators.

The Rome Statute requires severe physical or mental pain or suffering intentionally inflicted on a person in the custody or under the control of the perpetrator, subject to the applicable exclusions.

The evidence provide grounds for investigating torture, particularly where survivors describe repeated beatings, threats, and prolonged detention.

Rape and other sexual violence, Article 7(1)(g)

BROUK's May 2026 briefing documented allegations of rape, gang rape, and sexual abuse of Rohingya women and girls in AA-controlled areas.

The accounts concern different settings, including displacement, detention, recruitment operations, and civilian homes.

The reported conduct is serious enough to warrant investigation under Article 7(1)(g). 

Persecution, Article 7(1)(h)

Persecution may be among the most significant potential crimes against humanity raised by the evidence.

Unlike some other Article 7 offenses, persecution specifically requires discriminatory intent. It involves intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights because of a person's membership in an identifiable group or collectivity, together with the additional legal requirements of the Statute.

The allegations against AA personnel concern restrictions on movement, deprivation of property, denial of return, coercive labor, detention, and violence affecting Rohingya civilians.

Evidence that some other ethnic communities also experienced forced labor does not automatically exclude persecution. The legal assessment must examine the purpose, severity, and distribution of the abuses, including whether Rohingya faced distinctive or disproportionate treatment.

The public evidence provides substantial grounds to investigate persecution of Rohingya.

Enforced disappearance, Article 7(1)(i)

Reports of Rohingya men being taken away by AA personnel and subsequently missing raise serious concerns.

But the crime against humanity of enforced disappearance has specific requirements beyond unlawful detention or an unresolved missing-person case.

Investigators must establish the relevant deprivation of liberty, involvement of a state or political organization, refusal to acknowledge detention or provide information. The other required elements, including the requisite intent concerning protection of the law.

Some reported cases may ultimately meet those requirements. Others may be more appropriately classified as unlawful detention, murder, or other crimes.

The evidence currently supports investigation but is insufficient to classify every reported disappearance as the crime against humanity of enforced disappearance.

Other inhumane acts, Article 7(1)(k)

Article 7 also covers other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering or serious injury to physical or mental health.

This provision may be relevant to particularly severe forms of coercion or mistreatment not fully captured by another listed offense.

But it should not be used as a general category for every abusive administrative measure. The conduct must satisfy the provision's requirements, including comparable gravity and the necessary consequences.

The reported conditions imposed on displaced families, severe deprivation of essential resources, and certain forms of abusive labor warrant examination where the evidence establishes the required level of suffering or injury.

5.6. Weight of Evidence and Limits of the Finding

The strongest corroborated evidence supports deliberate attacks on civilians, including at Hoyyar Siri, while other accounts vary in corroboration and the degree to which specific Article 7 offenses can be established. The finding of crimes against humanity rests on the supported underlying acts together with evidence of a civilian-directed course of conduct, its widespread or systematic character, organizational policy, and perpetrators’ knowledge.

The report’s finding concerns the legal characterization of documented conduct; it does not establish that every allegation is verified or determine the criminal guilt of any identified individual.

5.7. Legal Conclusion

This report concludes that the documented conduct attributable to AA personnel constitutes crimes against humanity against Rohingya civilians under the Article 7 framework.

The strongest evidence concerns deliberate killings, especially Hoyyar Siri. Corroborated accounts and recurring practices also support assessment of forcible transfer, severe deprivation of liberty, torture, and persecution. Allegations of sexual violence and disappearance require offense-specific findings without weakening the broader conclusion.

The documented acts were directed against a civilian population and occurred across multiple locations and periods, including under AA administrative control. Their recurrence and geographical spread support the widespread or systematic element.

The AA’s military command and administrative structures, together with recurring enforcement practices, support the inference of an organizational policy behind the connected course of conduct. This inference is grounded in patterns of implementation, not simply the AA’s capacity to govern.

The required connection between the underlying acts and the broader attack is supported by their repeated targeting of Rohingya civilians and implementation by armed and administrative personnel. Knowledge must ultimately be assessed for each accused person using the evidence of their actions, roles, and awareness.

The supported underlying offenses include murder and, on the evidence assessed, conduct constituting forcible transfer, imprisonment or severe deprivation of liberty, torture, and persecution. Reported rape, enforced disappearance, and other inhumane acts require individualized proof of their additional elements. Property destruction, forced recruitment, and forced labor may separately constitute war crimes or serve as evidence of particular Article 7 offenses, but are not automatically standalone Article 7 crimes.

Accordingly, the report reaches an affirmative conclusion on crimes against humanity while reserving the question of individual criminal responsibility for competent judicial proceedings.

VI. Individual and Command Responsibility

6.1. From Organizational Findings to Individual Liability

The legal assessment in Section V concerns the character of the conduct, not the criminal guilt of every person associated with the United League of Arakan or Arakan Army. International criminal law requires responsibility to be established for identified individuals. Membership in an armed organization, a senior title, or political support for its objectives is insufficient by itself. Investigators must establish a person's conduct, contribution, mental state, and connection to the charged crime. Article 25 of the Rome Statute provides possible modes of individual responsibility, including committing, ordering, soliciting, inducing, aiding, abetting, or otherwise contributing to qualifying crimes under the applicable conditions.^[130]

6.2. Military Commanders and Civilian Superiors

Article 28 of the Rome Statute provides separate standards for military commanders and other superiors. For a military commander, the central questions include effective command or authority and control, knowledge or the circumstances in which the commander should have known of crimes, and failure to take necessary and reasonable measures within their power to prevent or repress crimes or submit the matter to competent authorities.^[131] For a civilian superior, the knowledge standard and relationship between the crimes and the superior's effective responsibility and control differ. Formal rank alone does not establish effective control; investigators must examine the practical ability to issue orders, obtain reports, discipline personnel, and intervene.^[132]

6.3. Evidence Needed to Identify Responsible Officials

The next investigative step is to connect particular units, commanders, detention authorities, and administrative officials to specific conduct already documented in this report. Relevant evidence includes deployment records, command communications, detention registers, labor and recruitment orders, land-allocation decisions, witness identification, and proof of disciplinary responses or their absence. The reported operation of parallel military and administrative institutions is relevant to the capacity for oversight, but it cannot substitute for proof of an individual's authority or knowledge. The reported punishment of two soldiers in an earlier sexual-violence case is relevant to the existence of a disciplinary mechanism; it does not resolve whether later allegations were investigated effectively.

6.4. Assessment

The evidence warrants focused investigation of direct perpetrators and persons who allegedly ordered, facilitated, or knowingly failed to address crimes within their effective control. This is a stronger and more precise accountability position than attributing every act to the AA's entire leadership without an individualized evidentiary basis.

VII. Attribution, Competing Accounts, and Evidentiary Limits

7.1. Distinguishing Perpetrators

The conflict involves the Myanmar military, the AA, and Rohingya armed organizations. Their separate conduct must not be combined into a single account of responsibility. Where evidence establishes an abuse but not the identity of the perpetrator, the report's findings should reflect that distinction. Territorial control is relevant to opportunity and access, but is not conclusive proof that the controlling force committed an incident.

7.2. Resolving Disputed Incidents

A denial by an armed actor is neither proof of innocence nor proof of guilt; it is evidence to evaluate against independently verifiable material.

7.3. Assessing AA Explanations and Conduct

The AA's security explanations, assertions that restrictions apply across communities, and public commitments to protect civilians deserve consideration. The relevant test is whether these accounts explain the specific conduct, whether measures were lawful and necessary, and whether credible allegations led to effective investigation and remedies. The presence of armed Rohingya groups cannot justify treating Rohingya civilians collectively as combatants or punishing people on the basis of ethnic identity.

7.4. Weight of the Available Record

This report is a synthesis of public investigations, not a criminal trial or independent forensic inquiry. Corroborated eyewitness accounts and authenticated visual material generally support firmer incident findings than anonymous reports that cannot be independently checked. Several publications repeating one original testimony do not create several independent sources. Inaccessible sites, missing records, threats to witnesses, and uncertainty over the fate of missing persons limit what can presently be concluded about individual incidents. These limits should shape the wording of particular findings without erasing the cumulative significance of evidence that is independently supported.

VIII. Accountability and Jurisdiction

8.1. International Criminal Court

The ICC's investigation concerning Bangladesh/Myanmar provides an important accountability pathway, but jurisdiction must be assessed for each alleged crime. Myanmar is not a party to the Rome Statute. The Court has recognized territorial jurisdiction over qualifying conduct involving an element occurring in Bangladesh, a State Party, including alleged deportation across the border. That does not create automatic ICC jurisdiction over every killing, detention, or property offense occurring wholly inside Myanmar. Prosecutors must assess the territorial, temporal, and subject-matter requirements and any other valid jurisdictional basis before pursuing a particular charge.

8.2. Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar

The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar is mandated to collect, consolidate, preserve, and analyze evidence of the most serious international crimes and violations of international law committed in Myanmar since 2011 and to prepare files for use in competent courts. It is not itself a criminal court. Evidence concerning AA personnel should be preserved and assessed alongside evidence concerning other perpetrators, with particular attention to command structures, the authenticity of digital records, and the safety of survivors.

8.3. National Proceedings and Other Legal Routes

Where domestic courts have a valid jurisdictional basis, national criminal proceedings may offer another avenue for individual accountability. The availability of universal or extraterritorial jurisdiction depends on the law of the forum state and the particular offense.

IX. Civilian Protection and Remedies

9.1. Immediate Protection Obligations

All parties exercising power over civilians must respect applicable international humanitarian law and human rights standards. In areas under ULA/AA authority, practical measures should include prohibiting attacks on civilians, ending coercive recruitment and labor practices, preventing torture and sexual violence, and ensuring that detention is not arbitrary. Civilian complaints must be received safely and addressed through credible procedures independent of alleged perpetrators.

9.2. Humanitarian Access and Freedom of Movement

Humanitarian access, emergency medical care, food security, and safe movement are urgent protection needs. Security measures should not operate as collective punishment or discriminatory restrictions on Rohingya communities. Humanitarian organizations need reliable access to assess needs and deliver assistance without coercion, diversion, or retaliation against beneficiaries.

9.3. Return, Property, and Reparations

A meaningful remedy for displacement requires more than permission to cross a checkpoint. Return must be voluntary, safe, dignified, and sustainable. Families need access to homes and agricultural land, procedures to contest confiscation, documentation of ownership and occupancy, and remedies for unlawful destruction or seizure. Where restoration is impossible, compensation and other appropriate reparations should be considered. No return arrangement should depend on accepting discriminatory identity restrictions or surrendering rights.

9.4. Non-Discrimination and Participation

Rohingya residents must be able to participate meaningfully in decisions affecting their safety, land, services, and future. Civilian protection is not satisfied by statements of inclusion alone. It requires transparent rules, equal treatment, independent monitoring, and mechanisms through which women, survivors, displaced families, and other affected people can raise concerns without fear.

X. Final Conclusion

On the evidence examined, this report concludes that AA personnel committed conduct constituting crimes against humanity against Rohingya civilians. The conclusion rests on supported underlying offenses and a civilian-directed course of conduct that was widespread or systematic and linked to organizational practices. Rohingya eyewitness accounts implicating the AA in the Naf River attacks remain part of the record, but the disputed attribution of those incidents is not treated as conclusively established. The evidence also supports the conclusion that displacement is becoming a permanent feature of AA policy through land clearance, repurposing, and restrictions on return.

Individual criminal guilt, including the responsibility of commanders and civilian superiors, must be established through judicial proceedings on the evidence relevant to each person. Protection, accountability, and remedies for Rohingya civilians remain essential regardless of the identity or political aims of the perpetrators.